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The world food and non-food needs are expected to increase from 2005/2007 to 2050 by 60 
percent, raising concerns on how this demand will be fulfilled sustainably (Le Mouël and 
Forslund, 2017). To cope with this increase in demand, the agricultural sector faces an 
essential decision between land sparing and land sharing, a debate particularly active in the 
last decade (Alexandratos et al., 2012; Harrison, 2002; Le Mouël and Forslund, 2017; 
TheRoyal Society (London), 2009). On the one hand, central elements of the debate concern 
the effects of agricultural intensity (or yield) on biodiversity, while land-sharing integrates 
nature conservation approaches into agricultural production across a region but characterized 
by low-yielding farmland with higher biodiversity, but with less land available for the sole 
purpose of nature conservation. The increase of agricultural land is of particular attention 
because it expands through the alteration of forests, swamplands, and other pristine habitats 
(Barbier, 2004). On the other hand, land-use change to expand agriculture increases 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and is accountable for 12-17% of the total global GHG 
emissions, negatively impacting biodiversity and ecosystem services (Hamilton et al., 2015; 
Pradhan et al., 2015). 
 
On the other hand, an increase of yields requires an increase in production which will be 
constrained by the finite resources provided by Earth's land, oceans, and atmosphere 
(Godfray et al., 2010); therefore, producing more food from the same area of land while 
reducing negative environmental externalities, can be accomplished by the use of existing 
sustainable practices (FAO, 2011; Godfray et al., 2010; Jordan, 2015; Tubiello et al., 2014). 
Farmers' decisions regarding adopting agricultural practices are based on pre-existing 
networks, organizations, and other relationships among individuals (Ostrom and Ahn, 2003). 
Although adoption has been widely studied, it shows a disciplinary fragmentation (Pannell et 
al., 2006). Social capital is a concept that helps integrate with the economic analysis of 
communities' cultural, social, and institutional dynamics. Social capital is a mechanism that 
helps to overcome market imperfections and promotes collective action, generating positive 
externalities that facilitate cooperation to achieve goals. Still, it can also have a negative side 
(Ostrom, 2007). This dissertation aims to analyze the role of social capital through two case 




constructs affects the decision to adopt pressurized irrigation systems using a cross-sectional 
survey. The second case study focuses on social capital and incentives effects on pro-social 
behavior, especially looking at land allocated for the cultivation of rubber agroforestry in 
Indonesia under individual and collective Payment for Environmental Services (PES) schemes 
applying a framed-field experiment.  
 
Results show that social capital plays an important role in adopting sustainable practices in 
the agricultural sector.  On the one hand, we provide empirical evidence about the significant 
and positive influence of social capital variables on the level of perceived control and intention 
to perform the adoption of pressurized irrigation. On the other, we show that social capital, in 
the form of a network, could negatively influence conservation behavior when the social norm 
is to cultivate the more profitable crop, as in Indonesia's oil palm under PES schemes. We find 
that individuals were more susceptible to social capital variables under collective schemes 
than in the individual scheme. Social capital in the form of a network shows a negative and 
significant influence on the share of land allocated to rubber agroforestry. 
 
In contrast, membership and environmental awareness of the network have a positive 
influence. Individual characteristics such as individual environmental perception, land tenure, 
and if the participant cultivates rubber agroforestry were more relevant in the individual 
scheme. When comparing both case studies, the differences in the sign of the effect of social 
capital, precisely the effect of a social network, reaffirm the need to design context-specific 
strategies and consider each site's social dynamics.  In addition, the results show that land 
heterogeneity matters; collective schemes may be especially suitable to engage large 
landowners, who may feel the moral pressure to contribute their share under such institutional 
arrangements. In contrast, smaller farmers respond to individual and collective incentives. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the effectiveness of PES is highly place-specific and 
depends on the social norms prevalent in the communities.  
 
Our empirical results have important policy implications. In the case study from Chile, we 
identified that attitude campaigns are not enough to influence intentions. The government 
could target and change the norm of superficial irrigation by convincing people of core beliefs 
associated with water conservation awareness and boost farmers' trust in water organizations 
that could foster cooperation to adopt pressurized irrigation systems as a norm. In the case 
study in Indonesia regarding Payment for Environmental Services, our findings have important 
implications for REDD focus countries, which is the most crucial arena for collective PES 




for conservation, and complement informal institutions. Future PES should focus and be 
tailored to the participants' characteristics in terms of endowment and should have a better 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. Agriculture and sustainable practices   
The world food and non-food needs are expected to increase from 2005/2007 to 2050 by 60 
percent, rising concerns on how this demand will be fulfilled sustainably (Le Mouël and 
Forslund, 2017). In order to cope with this increase in demand, the agricultural sector faces 
an essential decision between land sparing and land sharing, a debate particularly active in 
the last decade (Alexandratos et al., 2012; Harrison, 2002; Le Mouël and Forslund, 2017; 
TheRoyal Society (London), 2009). In one hand, central elements of the debate concern the 
effects of agricultural intensity (or yield) on biodiversity, while land sharing integrates nature 
conservation approaches into agricultural production across a region but characterized by low-
yielding farmland with higher biodiversity, but with less land available for the sole purpose of 
nature conservation. The increase of agricultural land is of special attention because it 
expands through alteration of forests, swamplands and other pristine habitats (Barbier, 2004). 
Land use change to expand agriculture increases Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, 
accountable for 12-17% of the total global GHG emissions, and impact negatively biodiversity 
and ecosystem services (Hamilton et al., 2015; Pradhan et al., 2015). In the other hand, 
increase of yields requires an increase in production which will be constrained by the finite 
resources provided by Earth’s land, oceans and atmosphere (Godfray et al., 2010); therefore, 
producing more food from the same area of land while reducing negative environmental 
externalities, can be accomplish by the use of existing sustainable practices (FAO, 2011; 
Godfray et al., 2010; Jordan, 2015; Tubiello et al., 2014).  
 
Sustainable practices aim to assure that farmers can receive a fair level of income, while 
protecting the environment and keeping their families and communities stable (Fazio et al., 
2017). Sustainable practices include a wide range of activities at the farm level such as: 
rotation of crops or development of agroforestry systems that help maintain soil fertility; 
efficient water management; natural resources management; reduction on input reliance 
(mineral fertilizers and chemical pesticides), among others (Lee, 2005; Nations, 1995). 
Specifically with regards to water resources, agriculture accounts for about 70% of the total 
freshwater withdrawals globally and for over 90% in the majority of least developed countries 
(LDC)(UNESCO, 2016); an increase in demand by the agricultural sector will imply 





competition with the domestic, energy and manufacturing sector (AQUASTAT, 2014). In this 
sense, adoption of drip irrigation or pressurized irrigation systems provides better control on 
the amount of applied water and better irrigation uniformity. (Battikhi and Abu-Hammad, 1994) 
compared efficiencies of surface and pressurized irrigation systems showing levels of 
efficiency of 53% and 70% respectively. In general, sustainable practices are being promoted 
because they have been proven to be effective to increase production and reduce negative 
environmental impacts (Bullock, 1992; Letey et al., 1990; Playán and Mateos, 2006; Snapp et 
al., 2005; Tilman, 1999; Tilman et al., 2002), yet adoption rates are still low. Pretty and Hine 
(2001) reported that from the total farmland in Africa, Asia and Latin America only 3% have 
adopted sustainable practices.  Several challenges have to be faced in order to increase 
adoption rates of sustainable practices by farmers whose management choices affect services 
linked to water, soil, climate and wild species (Hamilton et al., 2015). Choices are based in 
pre-existing networks, organizations and other relationship among individuals (Ostrom and 
Ahn, 2003). Social capital is a concept that integrates cultural, social and institutional 
dynamics of communities.  Social capital is a characteristic of individuals and of their 
relationships, it is generated through social relationships resulting from exchanges among 
members involved in an organization (Islam et al., 2006). Social capital can generate positive 
externalities but it also can generate negative externalities for others. There is a gap in the 
literature with regards to the effect of social capital on cognitive constructs that affect the 
process of decision-making, as well as the role of social capital in pro-social behavior when 
providing incentives.  This is of special importance because social capital generates positive 
externalities that facilitates cooperation for the achievement of goals but it can also have a 
negative side (Ostrom, 2007). 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the role of social capital through two case studies; 
one, which analyses how social capital and its interaction with psychological constructs affects 
the decision to adopt pressurized irrigation systems. The second case study focuses on the 
effect of social capital and incentives on pro-social behavior specially looking at adoption of 
rubber agroforestry in Indonesia.  
 
2. Conceptual framework  
Several studies have identified that adoption is constrained by socioeconomic characteristics, 
economic factors, education and information, and land tenure (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; 
Fazio et al., 2017; Feder et al., 1985; Pannell et al., 2006; Prokopy et al., 2008; Shiferaw et 





al., 2009). Although, adoption has been widely studied it shows a disciplinary fragmentation 
(Pannell et al., 2006). In economics, adoption behavior is modeled as a decision made by 
perfectly rational agents (Lecouteux, 2013). In psychology, behavior is modeled based on the 
influence of cognitive constructs, being the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) the most 
commonly used to predict behavior (Ajzen, 2015, 2011, 2002, 1985). TPB proposes that 
behavior is predicted from intention and this from attitudes, perceived control and subjective 
norms (Lynne et al., 1995). Experimental economics have rejected the selfishness assumption 
that individuals could not achieved join benefits when left by themselves if everyone would 
benefit whether or not they contribute to the effort and proposed social capital as a concept 
that exchanges trust among people and therefore breed cooperation among individuals. 
Although each discipline have identified constraints that have been removed on specific 
cases, generally it is observed that immediate and uniform adoption in agriculture is rare 
(Feder et al., 1985).  
 Social capital 
Economic research incorporates the concept of social capital to integrate the cultural, social 
and institutional dynamics of communities. Research includes the three forms of social capital: 
network, trustworthiness and formal and informal rules of institutions (Hawkins, 2007; Ostrom, 
2007). Social network is seen as a mechanism that could help overcome market imperfections 
as it is a means to access information, acquire financing, safeguard against unexpected 
catastrophes, reduce information asymmetries and enforce contracts (Di Falco et al., 2011; 
Maertens and Barrett, 2013). When networks are well-established individuals can draw on 
ideas and experiences and compare the ethics of others (Pelling and High, 2005; Putnam, 
1993).  Membership is a key important element for networking; it provides benefits in terms of 
access to financing or cooperative loans. When individuals are attached to an organization 
they share common values and codes of behavior (social norms) generating places to 
replicate knowledge and exchange information (Grootaert, 1999). Although a member of a 
network may only know a small number of other members, he has access in turn to the 
networks and communities of these associates. These connections can lie dormant until some 
change in the requirements of the individual encourages a search for new information or other 
forms of support (Pelling and High, 2005).   However, Maertens et.al. (2013) highlights that 
the literature related to the role of social networks remain underdeveloped as more research 
needs to be done to relax the assumption that social interactions reflect learning, as well as 
more detail data collection on individual subjective beliefs about different technologies and 
their traits, among others.  






Trust is a social tie that makes that common knowledge plays a self-enforcing agreement 
between two parties; it facilitates efficient contractual relations, reduce transaction cost in an 
imperfect market and allows adaptation to unexpected contingencies in an optimal way for the 
parties (Coleman, 1988; Lorenz, 2000). For example, Coleman (1988) shows that a group 
with an extensive trustworthiness can accomplish more and that repeated interaction fosters 
individuals to build a reputation of being trustworthy.  
 
Institutions – formal and informal rules are a form of social capital, they are the guidelines of 
the game that people develop (Ostrom and Ahn, 2003). Social norms are informal rules shared 
and respected by other people in order to be partially sustained and enforced by the general 
community (Elster, 1989). Social norms are specially important because they arise when 
markets cannot be easily established, transactions costs are high and when the actions have 
external effects (Coleman, 1988, 1987). Elster (1989) identified norms of reciprocity, work 
norms, norms of cooperation as examples of social norms. In this study we will focus on norms 
of reciprocity. Norms of reciprocity is a type of social norm (Putnam, 1993), which measures 
individuals' knowledge sharing propensity capturing the extent to which farmers see 
themselves as providing value to their organization through their knowledge sharing (Putnam, 
1993; Rouxel et al., 2015; Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi, 2015). The presence of social 
norms increase the levels of satisfaction, their absence allows individuals to achieve greater 
satisfaction from their own actions, but leaves them with less satisfaction overall, as they 
suffered from unconstrained action of others (Coleman, 1987). Norms are expectation about 
actions, and this is particularly important when analyzing technology adoption or pro social 
behavior, because the effect might not always be positive. As Ostrom (2003) underlines, there 
is a dark side of social capital when a smaller group leading to high benefits for those involved 
generates negative externalities for others.    
 
Social capital includes more individualistic behavioral dispositions (i.e. trust, reciprocity, social 
skills and macro-institutional quality measures) (Woolcock, 2001). The three forms of social 
capital increased trust among the community. For instance, the trust among network members 
is a honorable resource that enables certain actions for the farmer and creates incentives to 
behave in a trustworthy manner (Putnam, 1993; Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi, 2015).  
 
In addition to social capital, here we present the conceptual framework of the Theory of 
Planned Behavior used jointly with social capital to analyze adoption of pressurized irrigation 





in Chapter 2. Then we present Payment for Environmental Services as the framework of the 
framed field experiment of Chapter 3. 
 
 Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
TPB is based on the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) first proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen 
in 1967 (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2011), TRA suggested that under volitional control, behavior can 
be predicted from individual beliefs with regards to norms, control and behavioral beliefs which 
are channeled through attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control. These three core 
unobserved variables create the intention to perform an specific behavior and intention alone, 
under complete volitional control, predict actual behavior. Volitional control is understood as 
the extend of control that the individual has over an specific behavior (Glanz et al., 2008).  
Ajzen (1985) expands TRA and includes perceived behavioral control to consider those key 
aspects that are beyond individual control but that affect directly the intention and actual 




Figure 1. Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) 
 
TPB comprises four unobserved cognitive constructs: attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived control to create intention. To measure attitudes, information with regards to 
individual beliefs towards the usefulness of the behavior, and the level of difficulty/easiness is 
gathered. These beliefs weighed by the appraisal of the outcome of the action define the 
Attitude. Individuals with strong beliefs or perception about the positive outcome of an action 
will have a positive attitudes, and the contrary applies when the perception is strongly negative 





(Glanz et al., 2008).  To measure subjective norms, information with regards to what extend 
the individual is concerned to comply with others (family or close friends) approval or 
disapproval. Individuals who give high weight to their network expectation are more likely to 
feel positive about having the intention and changing their behavior, while those whose belief 
is that by performing the behavior they will be disapprove socially then will have a lower 
subjective norm, intention and will be less prompt to change their behavior (Conner and 
Armitage, 1998). 
 
The third important element of TPB is perceived control, which incorporates aspects that are 
beyond the motivation of the individual. This concept is used exchangeable with the concept 
of self-efficacy as it measures the extent to which the farmers feels confident, with the abilities 
required to perform the behavior. This predictor becomes more relevant when the individual 
has low volitional control, and when it is a close measurement of actual control; in this 
scenario, perceived control and intention have a direct effect on actual behavior (Madden, 
Ellen, and Ajzen, 1992). When volitional control is high, then, the effect of perceived control is 
mediated through intention. TPB emphasize that perceived control, if measured properly, can 
serve as strong proxy for actual behavior, Nonetheless, there are behaviors that require high 
investment cost, such as pressurized irrigation systems, that even when the measurement of 
perceived control is appropriate, it is not a good proxy for actual control, because the behavior 
will not be perform even if the individual has a strong intention and high perceived control. 
Success in performing the behavior relies not only on a positive intention but also on an 
adequate level of behavioral control (Ajzen, 2002). 
 
TPB postulate a theoretical framework that allows policy-makers to identify those beliefs that 
are constraining change on behavior. The weights of attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived control in determining intentions vary for different behaviors and populations. TPB 
and TRA have been widely implemented in the health sector; for example, it has been used 
to analyze decisions to exercise after an open-heart operation, or the behavior after having 
the intention to quit smoking. TPB has offered key elements to increase the success of 
strategies in the health sector in order to influence the beliefs towards an specific behavior 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). The TPB model has also been extended to include other 
determinants of intention, like self-identity (Pelling and High, 2005) , self-efficacy (Conner and 
Armitage, 1998) or moral norm (Yazdanpanah et al., 2014a). In agriculture, specifically when 
analyzing technology adoption, researchers used the direct measure of perceived control 
instead of a direct measure of control  (Ajzen 2002).  






 Payment for Environmental Services (PES) 
PES have been praised as a more flexible and effective instrument to facilitate protection of 
public ecosystem services as compared to those based on regulation (Ingram and Hong, 
2011; Narloch et al., 2012; Pagiola et al., 2005; Porras and International Institute for 
Environment and Development., 2010). PES is a market-based approach to conservation 
based on the twin principles that those who benefit from environmental services (such as 
users of clean water) should compensate those who voluntarily provide the services (or 
enhancing them) relative to a given baseline (Wunder and Borner, 2011, Wunder, 2005; 
Pagiola and Platais, 2007). The development of PES programs on agricultural lands is 
receiving attention in developing countries (Branca et al., 2011; FAO, 2007b; MA,2005; 
Ribaudoetal.,2010) as changes in agricultural land use strategies and production technologies 
can potentially enhance positive or negative environmental externalities (Ingram and Hong, 
2011). The main goal of PES ought to be the creation of incentives for the provision of such 
goods, thereby changing individual or collective behavior that otherwise would lead to 
excessive deterioration of ecosystems and natural resources. Therefore, it may be convenient 
to define PES as a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives 
to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the 
management of natural resources (Muradian et al., 2010a). Given these potential goals for 
PES policies, the likelihood of success depends on the design characteristics of a PES 
scheme and the context in which it is implemented.   
3. Research problem and objectives 
As mentioned above, the aim of this dissertation is to understand the role of social capital on 
adoption of sustainable practices. Specifically, we focus on conservation behavior towards 
adoption of two sustainable practices: 
1) Pressurized irrigation systems that improve water efficiency  (Chapter 2). 
Agriculture is the highest consumer of freshwater globally (FAO, 2011). Despite all efforts to 
promote highly efficient water conservation technologies in the agricultural sector, adoption 
rates are still very low. Worldwide there are 324 million hectares equipped for irrigation from 
which 86% uses surface irrigation, 11% uses sprinkler irrigation but only 3% has adopted 
localized irrigation which has high levels of efficiency (AQUASTAT, 2014). Water is limited 
and demand is increasing rapidly from other sectors such as the manufacturing, domestic and 





energy constraining water availability for irrigation in agriculture (Hearne and Easter, 1997; 
Rosegrant et al., 2000; Tran et al., 2016). Water conservation technologies play a key role 
facing current and future challenges due to climate change and population growth, they can 
achieve water savings from 30-60% and increases in yield by 20-50% (Darouich et al., 2014; 
Postel, 2000; van der Kooij et al., 2013). 
 
The specific research objectives of this chapter are:  
• To provide empirical evidence on how farmers’ attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
control influence intention and actual adoption of modern irrigation technology, measured 
12 months after the stated intention.  
• To gain an in-depth understanding on what is affecting farmers’ attitude, subjective norms 
and perceived control.  We propose the use of social capital to capture how beliefs are 
formed and understand the key constructs of TPB (attitude, subjective norms and 
perceived control) as they provide the framework within which farmers’ intentions are 
formed.  
This study fills two gaps. First, we assess intention and the revealed behavior of adoption after 
12 months. Second, we explicitly consider social capital (trust, network and membership) and 
control variables (access to extension services, water price, physical capital (ha), education 
and experience) that influence adoption, providing a more thorough understanding and a 
broader conceptualization.   
  
2) Rubber agroforestry systems that improve biological habitats, soil conservation, among 
others (Chapter 3). 
Indonesia spreads over more than 18,000 islands with high levels of endemic species and rich 
biodiversity. Oil palm plantations cover approximately 8 million hectares in Indonesia and it is 
expected that they will reach about 13 million hectares by 2020 (Cacho et al., 2014). The 
establishment of oil palm and timber plantations have now become the main drivers of 
deforestation in Indonesia (Cacho et al., 2014; Koh and Wilcove, 2008). Much of the 
production in Indonesia comes from large-scale plantations, however, independent 
smallholders are increasing their share and may dominate production in the future.  
 
In order to reduce the pressure on the forest, Payment for Environmental Services (PES) are 
regarded as a promising policy instrument to foster conservation and promote alternative 





agroforestry systems such as rubber agroforest. Although rubber agroforest can rapidly 
develop a vegetation structure close to that of secondary forest of similar age (Ekadinata et 
al., 2004) it is less profitable than oil palm plantations and therefore the cultivation of rubber 
agroforestry systems needs to be incentivize through PES schemes.  
 
PES reduce deforestation rates, although the effect is relatively modest (Samii et al., 2014). 
One concern that remains is that the functional value of a reserve for biodiversity conservation 
usually depends on its spatial configuration (Poiani et al., 2000). Individual payments do not 
explicitly promote the coordination among suppliers to conserve potentially resulting in lower 
ecological services.  An alternative to overcome this problem is to use a collective incentive 
scheme, where individual service providers receive a payment only if a minimum level of 
conservation is achieved at the group level (Kerr et al., 2014; Dickman et al., 2011). However, 
in collective schemes uncertainty on whether the threshold can be trespassed and the 
possibility for free-riding behavior might decrease the effectiveness of this instrument 
compared to an individual payment scheme. 
 
The specific research objectives of this chapter are:  
• To investigate the effectiveness of individual versus collective payments in promoting 
conservation using a framed field experiment.   
• To assess the response to two payment levels (low and high) and  
• To disentangle heterogeneous effects to individual and collective schemes.   
4. Data sources  
This dissertation is based on two different data sources: cross sectional survey to analyze 
adoption of pressurized irrigation in Chile and a framed-field experiment to assess 
conservation behavior under individual and collective PES schemes in Indonesia.  
 Cross-sectional Survey in the Maule Region in Chile 
The first case study was carried out in the Maule and O'Higgins regions of Chile. These regions 
contribute 14.9% of the agricultural gross domestic product (GDP), and 19% of the exports 
from agriculture in 2012 (ODEPA, 2013). Although the area’s basic productive structure is 
intensive in input use, including water; water efficiency are among the lowest nationwide of 
about 23-30%. The main agricultural production is concentrated in vineyards, which represent 
40% of the total cultivated area in Chile, fruit (mainly apples, cherries and berries), and 
intensive annual crops like maize and rice.        






The study applied a cross-sectional survey. The targeted population was small and medium-
scale vineyard producers and the sample size used in the study included 324 observations 
selected from 21 municipalities from the regions under study. All data was gathered applying 
a face-to-face questionnaire developed from a literature review, pre-pilot studies and previous 
in-depth interviews. Telephone follow-ups with 295 of the 324 participants (91% response 
rate) were conducted 12 months after the baseline. This follow-up call verified short-term 
actual behavior and facilitated a comparison with intentions declared one year ago.  
 
 Frame field experiment in the Jambi Province in Indonesia 
Harrison and List (2004) define ‘framed field experiment’ as an study that depart in a potentially 
important manner from typical laboratory studies because it is implemented in the field context 
in the commodity, task, stakes, or information set of the subjects. This type of experiment is 
important in the sense that a myriad of factors might influence behavior, and by progressing 
slowly towards the environment of ultimate interest one can learn about whether, and to what 
extent, such factors influence behavior in a case-by-case basis. In addition, by designing or 
manipulating real world markets, interesting economic phenomena can be explored(List, 
2008). This method to elicit preferences is the most convenient as we want to analyze the 
effect of an external PES incentive to promote conservation behavior by cultivating rubber 
agroforestry.  
 
For this we consider the Jambi province of Indonesia.  Indonesia has the third largest area of 
tropical rainforest in the world after the Amazon and Congo Basins (Fitzherbert et al., 2008).  
Despite its reputation as a global biodiversity hotspot, it is estimated that 53% of the total oil 
palm planted area in Indonesia is the result of deforestation since 1989 (Vijay et al., 2016). In 
response, Indonesia is a focused country under the UNFCC for forest conservation and 
REDD+ development activities. This study therefore provides insights on the effect of different 
PES schemes to promote sustainable land use.    
 
In the framed field experiment, participants decide how to allocate their endowment of land 
between two alternative products commonly grown in the region: rubber agroforestry and oil 
palm plantations. To examine how heterogeneity in endowments and in return affects 
conservation decisions, we vary the endowment of land that individuals in a group receive. 
Two individuals are low endowed and receive 5 units of land and one individual is high 





endowed and receives 10 units. The incentive was framed as Payment for Environmental 
Services aiming to foster environmentally friendly behavior associated with the cultivation of 
rubber agroforestry. Under the individual scheme, participants received the incentive 
individually for each unit of endowment individually allocated for conservation.  In the collective 
incentive scheme, every group member received the incentive once the total number of land 
units allocated to the conservation of rubber agroforestry in a group reached a minimum 
threshold level.    
Further descriptions of the different data sources are provided in the methodology section of 
each essay. 
 
5. Dissertation outline 
The dissertation comprises two essays and is organized as follow. Chapter 2 presents the first 
essay. Chapter 2. Do beliefs and social capital matter when adopting modern irrigation 
technologies? The effect of social capital on attitudes, subjective norms, perceived control and 
intention and on actual behavior of adoption of pressurized irrigation systems is analyzed 
using structural equation modeling. Chapter 3. Social capital and conservation under collective 
and individual incentive schemes: a framed field experiment in Indonesia presents  the 
findings of the effectiveness of individual vs collective incentives for conservation behavior by 
cultivating rubber agroforestry. Chapter 4. Concluding remarks provides the overall 






















Chapter 2. Planned behavior and social capital: 
Understanding farmers’ behavior toward 
pressurized irrigation technologies? 
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Abstract 
 Water scarcity is becoming a major challenge worldwide. The agricultural sector, as a main 
user of freshwater, may significantly increase its water use efficiency by promoting water 
saving strategies. This paper proposes a socio-psychological model that builds upon the 
Theory of Planned Behavior and social capital variables to examine how psychological 
constructs and their interaction with the environment and farmers’ _backgrounds influence the 
switch from traditional to pressurized irrigation. Considering temporal precedence, we 
measured farmers’ _intention to adopt irrigation technologies, and one year later their actual 
behavior. We used a structural equation model and estimated marginal effects for direct and 
indirect relations. The results show that actual adoption is affected directly by intention, and 
the effect of subjective norms, perceived control, and attitudes on adoption are mediated 
through intention. Social pressure exerts a strong influence on farmers, particularly in 
comparison to their own attitudes. Social capital triggers the adoption of pressurized irrigation 
by increasing social pressure and strengthening farmers’ _perceived self-confidence. 
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Water scarcity attributed to climate change and increasing population (IPCC, 2014; Fader, 
2016) is becoming one of the most relevant challenges worldwide. Global water demand is 
projected to increase by 20% to 30% by 2050 (using as baseline, 2018), from which industrial 
and domestic use are expected to grow faster (Boretti and Rosa, 2018). Given that agriculture 
is the main user of freshwater, with approximately 70% of the total availability, and an expected 
increase in irrigation water demand of 16% by 2050  (baseline 2000, (Motoshita et al., 2018; 
Pastor et al., 2019; Jordán and Speelman, 2020), policies aimed at promoting water saving 
strategies in the agricultural sector may have a major positive impact on the sustainability of 
the resource (Nair, 2019). Scholars have pointed out that efficient irrigation technologies, 
irrigation scheduling, and smart agriculture at the farm level, as well as basin management 
strategies and diversification of water sources, are valuable approaches to cope with the 
current scenario (Rosegrant et al., 2000; Hess and Knox, 2013; Tran et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 
2019; Galioto et al. 2020). Fader et al. (2016) concluded that efficient irrigation technologies 
such as drip and sprinklers can save up to 35% of water in the Mediterranean and similar 
results were found by Koech et al. (2018) in Australia. Aitken et al. (2016) in a study in Chile 
provides evidence that using irrigation technologies can reduce scarcity by 19%. Moreover, 
Ahumada et al. (2017) concluded that limiting water by 20% does not affect yields in olive 
orchards in Chile.  However, regardless of the favorable evidence, the adoption of efficient 
irrigation technologies is rather low. Worldwide, only 14% of the total of 275 million ha of 
irrigated land uses pressurized irrigation (Araujo, 2019). Hence a key question for policy 
makers is how to increase the use of technologies that can meet higher efficiency in water 
use. To date, the prevailing approach to understanding the drivers of farmers’ decisions 
regarding the adoption of water efficient technologies and practices is economic rationality, 
whereby the individual is motivated by the objective of maximizing his/her utility, subject to a 
series of constraints related to farm size, low levels of education, and limited financial 
resources (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Jara-Rojas et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Roco et al., 2014; 
Engler et al. 2016; Handschuch and Wollni, 2016). However, decisions are more complex than 
what purely economic rationality would indicate, and decisions also depend on cognitive and 
sociological variables (Yazdanpanah et al., 2014; Czap et al., 2016; Hunecke, 2017; Zeweld 
et al. 2017; Monteleone et al. 2019). Besides socio-economic constraints and drivers, 
individual behavior is based on the perceived value of the effectiveness, ease and/or difficulty, 
and advantages and/or disadvantages of the technology, all of which are subject to social-
psychological factors (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). Given this broader context to water-use 






decision-making, it is clear that we need to thoroughly elucidate the factors directing farmers’ 
behavior adoption (Klöckner, 2013). 
 
A widely used approach to explain individual behavior in the field of economic-psychology is 
the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985; Hansson et al., 2012; Yazdanpanah et 
al., 2015; De Leeuw et al., 2015; Monteleone, 2019). TPB proposes that the intention of a 
behavior acts as a mediator of attitude (individual beliefs with respect to the outcome of 
behavior), subjective norms (individual perception of social pressure), and perceived control 
(an individual’s opinion about their ability to carry out a particular behavior) (Glanz et al., 2008; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 2011). TPB has also been applied to agriculture (Borges et al., 2014; 
Yazdanpanah et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2016; Senger et al., 2017); however, few studies have 
applied the full model that includes the link between intention and actual behavior 
(Yazdanpanah et al., 2014; Meijer et al., 2015; Borremans et al., 2016; Niles et al., 2016). A 
downside of the aforementioned studies is that they estimate the relationship between 
intention and adoption at the same point in time, whereas the inference of a causal relation 
must have a temporal precedence (Kline, 2012; De Leeuw et al., 2015). Additionally, the 
agricultural literature has highlighted some shortcomings of TPB because it only focus on 
cognitive constructs and thus excludes the effect of the farmers’ environment and their 
interaction with the community, which can be considered an asset and produces private 
benefits (Durlauf, 2002; Sidibé, 2005; Ramirez, 2013; Zeweld et al. , 2018). 
 
This study aims to bridge these two gaps from the literature, (a) first by proposing a socio-
psychological model that examines how psychological constructs and their interaction with the 
farmers’ environment influence their intention to switch from traditional to pressurized 
irrigation, and (b) second by using a temporal scheme to link intention of adoption and actual 
behavior. There is a rich literature that uses social capital (networks, norms, and trust) to 
account for the relationship between the individual and the environment as a predictor of 
adoption behavior, concluding that the probability of adoption increases as the individual has 
more and deeper networks, higher trust in the surrounding community, and higher exposure 
to social norms (Esterhuyse, 2012; van Rijn et al., 2015; Wossen et al., 2015; Hunecke et al., 
2017). This leaves an unexplored question: how does the social context in which the farmers 
are embedded influence the cognitive constructs of decision-making? We additionally explore 
the role of socio-economic constraints in the decision to adopt pressurized irrigation and the 






association between the intention measured in year t0 and the actual behavior in t11.We test 
the socio-psychological model with vineyard farmers in the Maule and O’Higgins Regions of 
Chile, where adoption rates of pressurized irrigation are low despite the fact that pressurized 
irrigation has been proven to increase productivity and quality in vineyard and fruit species 
(Ahumada, et al. 2017; Acevedo -Opazo, 2010), and that the Chilean government 
implemented Decree law 18.450 to promote the construction and improvement of irrigation 
systems co-financing up to 80% of the total investment (Donoso, 2015; Hearne and Donoso, 
2014a; CNR, 2020). Hence, understanding farmers’ motivations and the relationships 
between social and psychological factors will provide insights into strategies that promote 
adoption and counteract those perceptions that delay and/or hinder adoption (De Leeuw et 
al., 2015). 
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis 
We propose an integrated theoretical framework that considers social, psychological, and 
economic factors. As a basis for this framework, we use the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
to account for cognitive constructs that have been proven in the psychology literature to 
influence behavior (Conner and Armitage, 1998; Ajzen, 2002;  De Leeuw et al., 2015), and 
extend this to include farmers’ social capital characteristics (network, levels of trust, and 
membership) which have been identified to have an effect on psychological variables 
(attitudes, norms, perceived control) (Willock et al., 1999; Nuthall, 2001). There are other 
experiences accounting for extensions of the TPB; for example, Yazdanpanah et al. (2014) 
extended the TPB model with moral norms, self-identity, and perceived risk in order to analyze 
an unobservable variable measuring water conservation in Iran, concluding that intention was 
mostly explained by norms and that perceived control does not affect intention or behavior. 
Another study that proposes an integrated approach including TPB, Value-Beliefs-Norm 
theory, and Norm-Activation theory was performed by Klöckner (2013). In essence, he found 
that the TPB model alone cannot provide full insight into conservation behavior and that the 




1 Based on recommendations from the Ministry of Agriculture, one year is a reasonable timeframe to observe 
changes in adoption. Farmers do have access to financial and extension services (in different degrees). 






For the purpose of our study, we follow the TPB framework proposed by Ajzen (1985), which 
proposes that intention acts as a mediator of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived control 
in explaining actual behavior (see Error! Reference source not found.) ( Glanz et al., 2008; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 2011; Manteleone, 2019). Specifically, attitude indicates the individual’s 
belief with respect to the outcome of performing a behavior (behavioral beliefs) and the 
evaluation of those results (Glanz et al., 2008). Subjective norms are defined by how the 
individual weights the expectations of “important others” regarding a certain behavior 
corresponding to informal rules (Hansson et al., 2012; Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014). Ajzen 
(1991) included perceived behavioral control to explain aspects outside the individual’s 
intention and behavior. Perceived control measures the individual’s opinion about their ability 
to carry out a particular behavior and the term can be used interchangeably with self-
confidence or self-efficacy (Ajzen, 2002). In TPB, perceived control has an indirect effect 
through intention but could also have a direct effect on behavior if it were strong enough to be 
used as a measurement for actual control (Ajzen, 2002). From the above, we state the first 
hypothesis as: 
 
H1. As farmers have a positive attitude towards the technology, feel social pressure to adopt, 
and perceive themselves to have the ability to act, they are more likely to adopt pressurized 
irrigation as their effects is mediated through intention to adoption. 
 
Empirical studies have shown that these unobservable cognitive constructs are socially 
learned, changed, and expressed (Hogg and Terry, 2000); the scope of the TPB framework 
provides information with regards to the customary codes of behavior in a group or people or 
larger cultural context, but further information with regards to the complete dynamics of the 
social context or of the continuous state of change as a result of new experiences is required 
(Nuthall, 2001). Therefore, we include social capital variables to account for social context 
effects. The literature suggests that individual behavior is driven by particular experiences and 
by the environment (e.g., social comparison, social norms), with both being powerful factors 
in decision-making (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Rode et al., 
2015). To account for this, we include trust and networks (measured as membership and size 
of network). We recognize that although beliefs are relatively stable, they can be malleable as 
events unfold and new information about a person or issue becomes available (Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 2011). Specifically, beliefs about the outcome of a technology can change over time as 
new informal rules in a society are established (Slusher and Anderson, 1996). 








Figure 2. Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and social capital – a socio-psychological model  
Note: The diagram applies standard nomenclature, using ovals to identify latent variables and rectangles for 
directly measured variables. 
 
Attitude changes can stem from different sources, but one important element related to 
technology adoption is trust, particularly because technologies are frequently promoted by the 
government or by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from outside the community 
(Genius et al., 2014). Trust relates to the level of confidence that a farmer has towards an 
entity, and whether he can count on the trusted entity (Jones, 1996; Lyon, 2000; Sponarski et 
al., 2014;). In the case of technology adoption, it is important to differentiate between general 
and institutional trust: general trust refers to the level of confidence of the farmer that he can 
rely on his community in the event of need ( Lyon, 2000; Khalil, 2003; Carmeli and Spreitzer, 
2009). Coleman (1988) highlights that trust facilitates productive activities by allowing groups 
to engage in information exchange and accomplish more when they have extensive trust 
(Coleman, 1988; Pannell et al., 2006; Wossen et al., 2015; Granja and Wollni, 2018). 
Institutional trust refers to trust in the government or NGOs, which will drive the subjective 
reliability of the source of information about the promoted technologies (i.e., how much farmers 
trust the source (Lyon, 2000)), thus affecting farmers’ attitudes. In the context of governments 
promoting the transition from traditional to pressurized irrigation systems, it is therefore 













































the same time, institutional trust creates commitment from the farmer to behave according to 
the community’s informal norms, thus inducing the formation of social norms (Coleman, 1988; 
Seddon and Levin, 2013). Summarizing the preceding review, we can state the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2. The higher the general and institutional trust, the more favorable will be the farmer’s 
perception of the outcomes (attitude); higher institutional trust will further be associated with 
higher perceived pressure to behave according to the social norm.  
 
A farmer’s social environment is created by a social network that functions as a platform for 
interaction and communication with a circle of friends and peers, members of a local 
organization, and other important connections. These constant interactions affect farmers’ 
beliefs, decisions, and behaviors (Jacques et al., 2018). Social networks allow individuals to 
connect, exchange ideas and experiences, look for help when in need or in doubt, and access 
new information, knowledge, and sources of credit ( Pelling and High, 2005; Esterhuyse, 2012; 
van Rijn et al., 2015). Farmers learn from each other and change their beliefs by learning from 
what others have adopted. Based on the above, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3. Farmers with a larger network using pressurized irrigation will feel more pressure to 
change from traditional to pressurized irrigation themselves but will also feel more confident 
to do so and will generally tend to have a more positive attitude towards pressurized irrigation. 
 
H4. Members of a local water organization perceive more social pressure to adopt pressurized 
irrigation. 
 
Nuthall (2001) indicated that previous experience influences decision making because lessons 
are processed instantaneously. Most farmers learn not only by testing a technology on their 
farms but also by exchanging experiences with close friends. Therefore, we include farmers’ 
backgrounds to account for variables such as previous experience with pressurized irrigation 
technologies, environmental awareness, education, and age. Weber et al. (2004) highlighted 
that the decision process starts with some form of problem recognition; therefore, we analyze 
whether the perception of water limitations has a direct influence on the farmer’s adoption of 
pressurized irrigation. Finally, we control for key variables that may play a role when farmers 
adopt irrigation, such as access to extension services, land area, and the fee paid to the water 
community for water use (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Borges et al., 2014; Rubas, 2004; Prokopy 






et al., 2008). Although additional relationships could be analyzed, we focus on the above 
elements to maintain the parsimony of the model. Figure 1 depicts the relationships and 
hypotheses we are testing.  
 
3. Materials and methods 
 Study area 
In this study, we focus on vineyard agricultural systems, which produce some of the top export 
products in Chile. The study was carried out in the Maule and O'Higgins regions. Both are 
located in the central part of Chile, characterized by a Mediterranean climate that is especially 
suited for the production of vineyards and fruits. In 2017, these regions contributed 34.8% of 
Chile’s agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) and 32% of the exports from agriculture; 
moreover, the Maule and O'Higgins regions contribute a combined 42% of total wine exports 
(29% and 13%, respectively) (ODEPA, 2017).  According to Easter and Huang (2014), during 
water shortages the Chilean water market promotes allocation to priority sectors; however, 
Hearne and Donoso (2014) highlighted that the water market is less effective in promoting 
efficient water management, particularly in the agricultural sector. Despite the exhibited mega 
droughts since 2010 in central Chile (Garreaud et al., 2020), adoption of pressurized irrigation 
is still low and waster is perceived as abundant. According to McPhee et al. (2012) efficiency 
levels of irrigation systems in central Chile varies from 35-45% , while in northern Chile, 
characterized by water scarcity, efficiency increases to 45-60%.   As  Jordán and Speelman 
(2020) highlighted, farmers are not incentivized to adopt pressurized irrigation due to the 
perceived relative abundance of water. Nonetheless, Lozano Parra et al. (2020) forecast a 
reduction of 936mm y-1 in precipitation by 2050 in Chile, highlighting that with the increased in 
water demand by the population and agriculture to produce export products, competition 
among economic sectors is exacerbated. Therefore, pressurized irrigation technologies (e.g., 
drip irrigation) are becoming more relevant to the Chilean economy.  
 Data collection 
The study applied a cross-sectional survey focused on collecting data about attitudes, 
perceived control, subjective norms, intentions, and the farmers’ environment and 
backgrounds. The questionnaire was developed based on a literature review and was 
subsequently validated in a focus group that included experts from academia, farmers, public 






sector officers (CNR 2  and INDAP 3 ), and extension services agents. In designing the 
questionnaire, a five-point Likert scale was used for all TPB variables (except for adoption 
behavior that is measured as a binary variable). The descriptors were strongly disagree, 
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, and strongly agree. 
 
The targeted population was small- and medium-scale vineyard farmers from 21 
municipalities4 from three valleys (Cachapoal/Colchagua, Curico and Maule) of the O’Higgins 
and Maule regions, from which 324 farmers were selected. Producers were selected randomly 
in situ with a protocol of being at least 1 km apart from each other. The number of producers 
correspond to a stratified sample based the wine growing cadastral 2012 of the Agriculture 
and Livestock Service. The data were gathered in face-to-face interviews that were conducted 
between November 2014 and February 2015. Each farmer was informed that they were free 
to refuse to participate, and no payment was made to the farmers. Those who declined to 
participate were replaced by alternate respondents.   
 
A telephone follow-up survey was conducted 12 months after the cross-sectional survey. We 
contacted all participants from the initial survey with a response rate of 91% (295 of the 324 
participants). The brief (approx. 10-minute) telephone follow-up focused on asking the farmers 
if they had adopted or extended pressurized irrigation technology. This follow-up call verified 
short-term actual behavior with regards to adoption of pressurized irrigation technologies, and 
it facilitated a comparison with intentions declared the year before, thus assuring the condition 
of time precedence. Hence, TPB and social capital variables and socio-economic 





2 National Irrigation Commission 
3 National Agricultural Development Institution 
4 The municipalities were, in order of number of surveyed producers: San Javier, Sagrada Familia, Curicó, Rancagua, Villa 
Alegre, Santa Cruz, Talca, Palmilla, San Clemente, Peralillo, Rio Claro, Requinoa, Chimarongo, Maule, San Vicente, and 
Peumo. 






4. Empirical Data 
 Model specification 
We use structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the hypotheses regarding the relationship 
among cognitive, social, and socio-economic variables simultaneously including 
measurement errors (Yazdanpanah et al., 2014). SEM is a multivariate estimator generating 
coefficients that allow us to estimate the magnitude and statistical significance of the structural 
relation between the latent and observed variables of the theoretical model. Following Figure 
1, the empirical model is expressed in the following equations: 
 
!"" = $%" + 	$(" + $)*+, + $-. + $/0 +	1!               (1) 
2)	 = $%" + $)*+, + $3*4 +	1"                                    (2) 
/. = $)*+, + $05+*67 + $/0 +	1#     (3) 
%)" = $!"" + $2) + $/. + 	$/0 + 1$        (4) 
And, adoption behavior 
!89/ = $%)" + $/. + $!:*; + $05+*67 + $!<* + $-. + $0=> +
$-/ + $-? + 	$/0	+	1%  
(5) 
where 1	@7	+ℎ*	*::B:	C*D+B:, which represents the errors-in-equations. 
The structural equations consider the latent variables of attitude (ATT), perceived control (PC), 
intention (INT), and institutional trust (IT); and the observed variables of subjective norms 
(SN), networks (Netw), membership (Mem) and general trust (GT) as for TPB and social 
capital variables. In the adoption behavior equation, we include variables such as water fee 
(WF), water limitations (WL), water conservation awareness (WC), previous experience with 
pressurized irrigation (PE), and control variables to complete the model relationships. The 
variable description is detailed in section 4.2. 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the variables are not normally distributed; therefore, we 
use the robust unweighted least squares (ULSMV) estimation procedure. The estimates of 
structural coefficients under ULSMV surpass maximum likelihood (ML) and robust maximum 
likelihood (MLR) in almost all asymmetric conditions, hence providing more robust standard 
errors under conditions of non-normality and when modeling categorical or ordered data (Li, 
2014). Additionally, to infer a causal relation between two variables, several statistical 






conditions must be met, as specified by Kline (2012): 1) intention and adoption should be 
measured at two different points in time; 2) covariation among the variables should be 
observed (see correlation matrix in Table A1); and 3) the statistical association should hold 
when controlling for other covariates that may have an effect on the variable of interest, in this 
case adoption (existence of isolation). 
 
To check the robustness of the model, we estimated three models using Equations 1 to 5, but 
with the following differences:  Model 1 was estimated with the total sample (324 observations) 
and without control variables (WC, PE, WL, WP, Extens, Area, Age, and EDU); Model 2 tests 
full isolation by estimating the empirical model with the total sample and control variables; and 
Model 3 tests  systematic differences among farmers with and without previous experience 
with pressurized irrigation technology by restricting the sample to farmer that at t0 did not have 
pressurized irrigation, resulting in a sample of 198 observations.   
 
Model fit is assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and 
the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). Conventional rules establish that a 
model is satisfactory if the CFI and TLI indices are higher than 0.9, and a model is considered 
excellent if the values are higher than 0.95 for both indexes. For RMSEA, values below 0.08 
are acceptable and below 0.06 are considered excellent (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2015; 
Li, 2014). The model was estimated with MPlus 7. 
 Variable description 
 Cognitive constructs (latent variables) 
For the cognitive constructs of attitude (ATT), perceived control (PC), intention (INT), and 
institutional trust (IT) we use a series of statements rated on a five-point scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree, following the guidelines and adjusted statements proposed by 
Ajzen (1991), to generate the factor scores that are used in the regressions. The literature 
uses Cronbach’s alpha to measure internal consistency and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
test to measure sampling adequacy; these indicators are not reported when estimating SEM 
in MPlus, hence we performed a factor analysis to validate the constructs. We estimate the 
Cronbach’s alpha and the KMO, observing results higher than 0.8 for ATT, PC and INT, 
implying high internal consistency and adequacy. IT shows satisfactory results with a KMO of 
0.73 and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83. Table A2 in the Appendix show results of factor analysis. 
Table 1 presents the average value of the constructs.   






 Observed variables 
Observable variables were measured through direct questions in the survey. For instance, to 
measure SN we follow Mobley et al. (2010) by asking: (1) “the water community to which I 
belong expects me to adopt pressurized irrigation technology” and (2) “other farmers look 
favorably upon me or would look favorably upon me if I adopted modern irrigation”. Both 
statements use a series of statements rated on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree and were averaged to deliver the variable SN. 
 
Networks were measured with two variables: (1) Netw: number of the farmer’s acquaintances 
who have adopted pressurized irrigation technologies; and (2) Mem: participation in water 
organizations is a binary variable equaling 1 when the farmer was part of a water organization 
and 0 otherwise. Following Grootaert (2003), GT was measured based on the statement “I 
can trust the people around me without being too cautious”, using a five-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
 
Background information on the farmers includes land tenure, area of their property, years of 
education, access to extension services, water fee (measured in Chilean pesos paid annually 
by the farmer5), previous experience (PE) with pressurized irrigation (take the value of 1 if the 
farmer has had any previous experience implementing pressurized irrigation system in their 
farm, or 0 otherwise), water limitations (WL) ( = 1 if the farmer has reported limitations on 
irrigation due to water shortages, 0 otherwise), and his level of water conservation awareness 
(WC). Water conservation awareness is measured using the statement “I would adopt modern 
irrigation technology because it helps to conserve water”. Descriptive statistics of these 
variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
5 The fee is a flat rate that is not based on the actual water quantity being used.   






5.  Results 
 Descriptive statistics 
 Characteristics of the sample 
Basic sociodemographic characteristics show that the average age of the farmers is 52.76 
years, 91% are male, and on average, they have 11.57 years of schooling. The baseline data 
show that 126 farmers (39%) have previous experience with pressurized irrigation, either 
because they have partially adopted it on their land or had it at some point in the past, and 
198 farmers (61%) have no experience. We observe that farmers who have experience with 
pressurized irrigation are significantly younger and have: more years of schooling (13.12 
years), less farming experience, higher area of land in tenure, additional sources of income 
(other than agriculture), and a higher perception of water limitations compared to those that 
have no experience with pressurized irrigation systems (Table 1).  
 
Extension services are provided free of charge by agricultural associations or by the Institute 
for Agricultural Development (INDAP) of the Agricultural Ministry, and these services have 
been used by 38% of the farmers in the sample. Regarding land tenure, most of the land is 
owned. According to the organization of water distribution system, farmers must pay their 
water communities a fee for the water rights they own; in our sample, 80% of the farmers pay 
an annual fee for their water right, independent of consumption. The yearly payment was 
20,176 Chilean pesos on the average, which is equivalent to US$32.18. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics baseline data (Standard deviation in parenthesis) 
 Variables 
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1 z-value for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
On average, farmers have moderate levels of general and institutional trust, with mean values 
of 3.58 and 3.28 (on a scale of 1 to 5), respectively. The average number of known 






acquaintances that use pressurized technologies is 6, and there is a significant difference 
between farmers who have previous experience with pressurized irrigation technology as they 
have almost twice the number of acquaintances compared to farmers who have no experience 
with irrigation technology. Participation in local organizations is relatively low: only 23% of the 
sample participates in a water organization. 
 
When analyzing the cognitive constructs of TPB, we observe moderate intentions to adopt 
pressurized irrigation technologies, with an average value of 3.18 (on a scale of 1 to 5), a 
positive attitude (with a score of 4.97), moderate subjective norm (3.39) and moderate 
perceived control (3.57). Comparing the values of farmers with and without previous 
experience with pressurized irrigation, there are significant differences in all these constructs, 
with those who have previous experience reporting higher scores on all aspects. The 
comparison between these two groups provides support for the hypotheses presented in 
section 2. The differences found here between the two groups regarding attitudes, subjective 
norms, perceived control, intention, and social capital variables are consistent with the 
literature and highlight the importance of considering farmers’ context and social environment 
when analyzing intentions and actual adoption behavior. 
 
 Relation between intention and actual behavior 
Actual behavior was measured 12 months after the application of the cross-sectional survey. 
Adopters are defined as those farmers who had either adopted or extended pressurized 
irrigation during the previous twelve months. For comparison and descriptive purposes, we 
recoded the variable intention (originally measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 5) into a dummy 
variable, where scores of ≥3 take the value of 1 aggregating the responses of those farmers 
with declared intention to adopt pressurized irrigation in the following year , and scores <3 
take the value 06. Figure  shows that 58% of the farmers stated an intention to adopt, and 17% 
adopted, pressurized irrigation technology. When comparing farmers with and without 
 
 
6 The recode of the intention variables was used only for comparison in the descriptive section. In the 
econometric analysis we used the five statements of intention as originally measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 
5, therefore in the econometric analysis the factor scores were used in the regression. 






previous experience, we find significant differences with respect to both intentions and actual 
behavior.  
 
Figure 2. Comparison of intention to adopt, and actual adoption of, pressurized irrigation. 
 
Among farmers with previous experience, 76% have the intention to adopt or expand the use 
of pressurized irrigation technology, while only 46% of the farmers without previous 
experience have such intention. Regarding actual behavior, 26% of the farmers with 
experience adopted the technology, compared to only 11% of the farmers without experience. 
These results support the hypothesis that knowledge can shape the attitudes and intentions 
of farmers. 
 SEM results 
As explained in section 4, we estimate three different model specifications to check the 
robustness of the multiple relations proposed in the theoretical framework. Model 1 estimates 
the relationships among the cognitive constructs of TPB and social capital variables without 
control variables. Model 2 estimates the relationships as in model 1, but additionally 
incorporates control variables to verify the assumption of isolation. Model 3 constrains the 
sample to those farmers who have not had any previous experience with pressurized irrigation 
technology. All three models present a satisfactory fit based on the criteria formulated by Hu 
and Bentler (1999) (Table 2), which compare the residual differences between the fitted and 



























With respect to the classical TPB variables, Model 1 shows that attitudes, subjective norms, 
and perceived control have positive and significant effects on intention (Eq. 4). Subjective 
norms exhibit the highest estimated coefficient (β=0.434, p<0.001), followed by perceived 
control (β=0.280, p<0.001), and attitudes (β=0.138, p<0.05), indicating that social pressure 
exerts a strong influence on farmers, particularly in comparison to their own attitudes. These 
results align with previous studies that have emphasized the influence of perceived social 
pressure on adoption (Renfroe et al., 1990; Burton, 2014). All three variables together explain 
43.5% of the variance in intention. Furthermore, Model 1 reveals that intention 7  has a 
significant and positive effect on adoption (Eq. 5), and thus, confirms that intention to engage 
in an action is the proximal antecedent of voluntary action (Ajzen, 2002; De Leeuw et al., 
2015). Based on these results, we can corroborate hypothesis H1 that farmers’ attitudes, 
subjective norms, and perceived control have a positive effect on intention and adoption of 
pressurized irrigation systems.  
 
Regarding the social capital variables, we observe mixed results. Model 1 shows that 
institutional trust is positively related to attitudes and subjective norms, while general trust is 
positively related to attitudes, thus supporting H2. These findings imply that higher levels of 
trust are associated with positive perceptions of the action outcomes (attitudes). Institutional 
trust can be seen as a cooperation agreement between the farmer and the institutions 
providing extension services, and therefore farmers feel committed to act according to the 
social norms embodied by these institutions (Khalil, 2003). The size of the network (Netw) is 
statistically related to perceived control, indicating that farmers will feel more confident about 
their ability to implement the technology when they are embedded in a large network of other 
adopters, thus partially supporting H3. Contrary to our expectations, Netw does not have 
significant effects on attitudes and subjective norms. Finally, membership in water 





7 As explained in section 4.2.1, intention is a latent variable estimated in SEM with all parameters 
simultaneously. It considers the statements indicated in appendix A2. Thus, intention is a factor 
score with the estimates for the true latent variable scores (Devlieger and Rosseel, 2017).  






Table 2. Standardized regression coefficients (Standard errors in parenthesis) 






Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Effect on attitudes (ATT) – Eq. (1)    






















Previous experience with the technology (PE)   0.37*** 
(0.14) 
 
    
Effect on subjective norms (SN) – Eq. (2)    


















    
Effect on perceived control (PC) – Eq. (3)    










Previous experience with the technology (PE)  0.95** 
(0.10) 
 
    
Effect on intention (INT) Eq. (4)    



















Previous experience with the technology (PE)  0.17** 
(0.07) 
 












Coef. Coef. Coef. 
    
Effect on adoption of pressurized irrigation (ADOP) – Eq. (5)    









































Previous experience with the technology (PE)  0.09 
(0.11) 
 
    
Goodness of fit indicators    
Chi-Square / Degree of Freedom relation 1.65 1.06 1.05 
CFI 0.94 0.96 0.94 
TLI 0.93 0.95 0.93 
RMSEA 0.045 0.014 0.017 




Note: The model estimates linear regression coefficients for continuous variables such as attitudes, 
subjective norms, perceived control and intention. For limited dependent variables that model estimates 
Probit coefficients. 
  






Model 2, which includes additional control variables, generates results that are consistent with 
Model 1 (i.e., most of the statistical associations persist). Overall, Model 2 explains 21.3% of 
the variance in actual adoption behavior (Eq. 5). Previous experience (PE) with the technology 
contributes to a positive attitude, to higher perceived control and intentions to adopt. In the 
adoption equation (Eq. 5), only physical capital and water limitations for irrigation have positive 
and significant effects. Model 3 shows consistency with the findings of Model 2 for the 
cognitive constructs.  
 
Further, we estimated the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable adoption (ADOP), including direct, indirect, and total effects. For this purpose, we use 
model 2 because it controls for additional covariates and presents the best goodness of fit. 
Table 3 provides the direct, indirect and total marginal effects8  of each variable on the 
probability of adoption (ADOP).  
 
Table 3. Direct, indirect and total effects on adoption 
Variables 
Standardized Coefficients  Marginal Effect (prob) 
Direct Indirect Total  Direct Indirect Total 
Cognitive constructs        
Intention (INT) 0.21**  0.21**  0.04**  0.04** 
Attitude (ATT)  0.04* 0.04*   0.016* 0.01* 
Perceived control (PC) -0.07 0.04* -0.03  0.01 0.01* 0.01 
Subjective norms (SN)  0.07** 0.07**   0.02** 0.02** 
        
Farmers social environment      
Institutional trust (IT) - 0.018* 0.018*   0.01* 0.01* 
General trust (GT) - 0.009 0.009    0.01 
Size of the network (Netw) 0.004 0.015 0.019  0.014 0.01 0.01 
Membership (Mem) - 0.041* 0.041*   0.01* 0.01* 
        
Farmers’ background        
Area 0.12*  0.12*  0.02*  0.02* 
Age -0.10  -0.10  0.00  0.00 
 
 
8 We estimate the Probit Regression Probabilities based on Muthén and Muthén (2009).    







Standardized Coefficients  Marginal Effect (prob) 
Direct Indirect Total  Direct Indirect Total 
Education (Edu) 0.13  0.13  0.04  0.034 
Water fee (WF) -0.04  -0.04  0.01  0.01 
Water limitations for irrigation (WL) 0.15*  0.15*  0.02*  0.02* 
Water conservation awareness (WC) 0.10 0.02* 0.12  0.04 0.02* 0.06 
Extension services (Extens) 0.04 -0.00 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Previous experience with the technology 
(PE) 
0.09 0.03 0.12  0.02 0.01 0.02 
The results show that attitudes (ATT), perceived control (PC), and subjective norms (SN) have 
significant indirect effects on adoption (ADOP), and that they are effectively mediated through 
intention. Membership in water organizations (Mem) increases the probability of adoption 
indirectly, because its effects are mediated through subjective norms. This finding can be 
explained by the well-established institutions in the Chilean Water Code that define water 
community organizations as key to water management. This is also reflected in the institutional 
trust that farmers have in these organizations. Higher institutional trust levels indirectly 
increase the likelihood of adoption through their positive effects on attitudes (ATT). 
 
With regard to control variables, having water limitations (WL) for irrigation shows a direct 
effect on the adoption of irrigation technologies. As expected, water fee (WF) shows no effect 
on adoption (ADOP), because the payment is not dependent on water consumption. To 
provide an incentive for more efficient water use, charges must be a direct function of 
consumption ( Southgate and Figueroa, 2006; De Fraiture and Perry, 2007) . Extension 
services (Extens) show a significant effect on perceived control (PC), but not on adoption 
(ADOP). Physical capital (Area), measured as farm size in hectares, positively and 
significantly influences adoption, meaning that larger farmers are more likely to adopt due to 
scale economies and larger capacity to bear risk (Diederen et al., 2003; Jara-Rojas et al., 
2012). Finally, we observe that water conservation awareness (WC) indirectly and positively 
impacts the likelihood of adoption mediated through its positive effect on attitudes and 
intentions. 
  
6. Discussion   
Several authors recognize the need to tie the individual’s cognitive processes to the 
environment where s/he is embedded, as farmers’ psychological characteristics are important 






non-economic elements of decision-making (Edwards-Jones, 2006; Manteleone, 2019). More 
interestingly, our work goes deeper to show that such attitudes, subjective norms, networks, 
and trust (general and institutional) are interconnected elements of two different frameworks 
that jointly explain farmers’ intentions to perform a specific action. This finding provides 
insights into the associations among a large number of variables that individual models are 
not able to show (Klöckner, 2013). In this sense, TPB acts as a mediator to unveil a more 
complex interaction of interconnected internal (psychological) and external (institutional) 
factors that can help us understand the decision-making processes underlying adoption. 
Although we are aware that a model that incorporates all factors might not be feasible, our 
proposed model sheds light on important cognitive, social capital, and economic factors that 
affect adoption. 
 
An additional contribution of our work is that it tests intention and actual behavior using a one-
year lifespan analysis. This approach is rare in the literature and even scarcer in decisions 
related to the agricultural sector. The results show that intention predicts actual behavior, and 
that modeling actual behavior enables testing both direct and indirect effects of interconnected 
variables, not only on intention but also on actual adoption. Farmers reported a positive 
attitude towards pressurized irrigation technology, believing that pressurized irrigation is 
profitable, improves crop management, and increases yields. This positive attitude indirectly 
affects adoption through intention. The impact of subjective norms on intention and its indirect 
effect on adoption is noteworthy, as is the fact that a farmer’s perception of what others expect 
him/her to do is influenced by institutional trust. Farmers are keen to adopt technologies that 
others approve of; this is in line with the findings of Läpple and Kelley (2013), who showed 
that social norms and the ability and resources of the farmer limited the adoption of organic 
practices. Yet, the implications of social norms go beyond social acceptance. Social norms 
define what is acceptable or unacceptable, providing the basis for maintaining trust and, at the 
same time, such norms create an obligation to engage in mutual effort (Lyon, 2000). 
 
Social capital provides access to more and better information (Jacques et al., 2018; Wuepper 
et al., 2018); hence, its inclusion, mediated through TPB variables, gives a sense of what is 
affected by this access to information. Being a member of an association provides access to 
information that can shape the willingness to adopt. In our results, membership directly 
impacts the intention to adopt the technology and indirectly affects actual adoption. This 
finding fills the gap identified by Prokopy et al. (2008), as our model provides evidence that 
membership has a positive and significant influence on intention. Our results also indicate that 






if the farmer trusts water community associations and water monitoring boards, it is more likely 
that he/she will have a higher intention to adopt modern irrigation technologies. Nonetheless, 
other studies have found that trust is negatively related to decisions regarding the adoption of 
irrigation technology and climate change adaptation ( Paul et al., 2016; Hunecke et al., 2017). 
Such contradictory results highlight the importance of understanding the relations of the 
elements of social capital and behavior on a case-by-case basis in order to design locally 
adapted policies. Overall, we can see that general and institutional trust, social norms, and 
membership are relevant in explaining adoption, directly or indirectly, through intention. 
Despite this, only 23% of the sample has had a role within local organizations. This represents 
an opportunity to design an intervention in which local organizations promote the engagement 
and active participation of farmers. 
 
The influence of perceived control on intention is positive and significant in our model. An 
individual’s belief in their capacity to execute the action will affect their behavioral intention. 
How confident a farmer is in adopting pressurized irrigation depends on the people around 
him/her who have adopted the technology, as shown by the influence of networks on 
perceived control. Social networks should be strengthened and used as an instrument to 
increase self-confidence levels among farmers. As Dowd et al. (2014) noted, strong networks 
make individuals feel more satisfied and confident with the amount of information they receive 
through their network. Social influences help shape a person’s estimation of their confidence 
and capability to use a system well (Bhatti, 1970). We measured social networks, through 
membership and the number of farmers that have adopted, so strategies should focus on 
encouraging an increase in membership and in the creation of discussion forums that foster 
interaction and, therefore, enlargement of the network. 
 
In the estimated model, we also included control variables focusing on the traditional economic 
incentives and restrictions that are part of the utility maximizing models. The results are indeed 
revealing. In general, other than physical capital, these variables do not have a significant 
effect on adoption, meaning that socio-psychological variables are capturing the effect they 
usually express in traditional models (Engler et al., 2016). Hence, more emphasis should be 
placed on developing a pro-adoption environment than on relaxing farmers’ constraints, such 
as providing high subsidies to promote adoption. 
 
Key policy implications can be derived from our empirical results. First, attitude campaigns are 
not enough to influence intentions. Therefore, policies introduced by governmental institutions 






could achieve better results by promoting long-term changes in beliefs and social norms. Even 
a policy without any financial incentive could result in more environmentally friendly and 
socially responsible behavior if it were designed to strengthen self-confidence and perceived 
social pressure (Czap et al., 2016). Second, initiatives from the government could define a 
strategy to change the current practice (the generally acceptable norm of traditional irrigation). 
Influencing farmers’ core beliefs associated with water conservation awareness, and boosting 
farmers’ trust in water organizations that could foster cooperation, could both lead to the 
adoption of pressurized irrigation systems as a norm (Klöckner, 2013). Third, extension 
services should focus on transferring knowledge and information through social networks to 
facilitate action and increase farmers’ perceived self-confidence about undertaking the 
challenge of switching from superficial to pressurized irrigation. In this context, such as 
strategy is more important than improving attitudes towards the technology. 
  
7. Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the farmers` 
behavioral beliefs, and the effect of the social environment on such beliefs, to explain adoption 
decisions. We argued that understanding how attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
control affect the intention of adoption is not enough to provide useful insights for policy. In 
doing so, we proposed an integral framework that includes the cognitive components of TPB 
and is extended by social capital variables. Our results provide novel insights into the decision-
making process, and they raise several points that can expand this line of research. First, 
decisions are a result of a dynamic process, and although we capture two points in time 
(individual intention and action), it would be interesting to analyze the changes in beliefs and/or 
social aspects in order to measure the indirect and direct effect on adoption of such aspects. 
Second, as the triggers of decisions are already in motion, we could also explore the impact 
of TPB and social capital on incremental adoption. Having a better understanding of the 
adoption path of the farmers could lead to proposing more purposeful policy incentives to 
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Abstract 
In this study, we explore the effects of payments for environmental services on land use 
decisions among farmers living in Jambi province in Indonesia.  Using a framed field 
experiment we compare land use decisions in a baseline with no payment with two alternative 
payments for environmental services (PES):  an individual incentive scheme, where each 
participant receives a flat rate payment for each experimental land unit conserved, and a 
collective incentive scheme that offers individual payments only if an aggregate pre-
determined conservation threshold is passed by the group.  We find that individual and 
collective PES are equally effective to increase environmentally friendly behavior associated 
with the cultivation of rubber agroforestry. Yet we find that whereas collective incentives work 
equally well for small and large farmers, individual incentives only work for small farmers.  In 
addition, collective incentives generate an increase in conservation even at low payment 
levels whereas individual incentives only work when payments are high. Participants with a 
larger social network cultivating oil palm invest a lower share of their endowment in 
conservation. These findings highlight how land heterogeneity and social capital influence the 
success of a PES scheme. 
Keywords: social capital, payment for environmental services, agroforestry, incentives for 
conservation 
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1. Introduction  
Over the last two decades, payments for environmental services (PES) have become a 
common environmental policy instrument to promote conservation (Le Velly and Dutilly 2016). 
PES are defined as a voluntary transaction where a buyer buys a well-defined ecosystem 
service from a service provider if and only if the provider secures its provision (Engel 2016; 
Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008). Due to the high cost of implementing command and control 
measures and weak institutions in developing countries, this policy instrument is regarded as 
being more effective than command and control instruments (Le Velly and Dutilly 2016; 
Narloch, Pascual, and Drucker 2012; Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005; Porras and 
International Institute for Environment and Development. 2010; Wunder and Borner 2011).   
 
Recent systematic reviews suggest that PES reduce deforestation rates, although the effect 
is relatively modest (Samii et al. 2014; Börner et al. 2017; Adhikari and Agrawal 2013).  
Experimental evidence supports this finding; e.g., offering payments to forest owners in 
Uganda for not cutting down their trees led to decreased deforestation rates (Jayachandran 
et al. 2017; DeFries 2017).  However, one concern that remains is how to bundle small 
individual contracts into one larger agreement to have a complete landscape coverage and to 
reduce transaction cost (Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal 2014; Ramirez-Reyes et al. 2018). 
Individual payments do not explicitly promote the coordination among suppliers to conserve, 
contiguous land parcels and hence potentially result in low ecological services.   
 
An alternative to overcome this problem is to use a collective incentive scheme, where 
individual service providers receive a payment only if a minimum level of conservation is 
achieved at the group level (Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal 2014; Dickman, Macdonald, and 
Macdonald 2011).  
 
However, uncertainty on whether the threshold can be trespassed and the possibility for free-
riding behavior might decrease the effectiveness of collective schemes compared to an 
individual payment scheme. For example, Narloch et al (2012) identified that collective 
incentives affect positively conservation outcomes but its effect was undermined due to free-
ridding behavior.  
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Social norms are understood  as key when implementing payment for environmental services 
(Clements et al. 2010; Grima et al. 2016; Midler et al. 2015; Muradian et al. 2010; Narloch, 
Pascual, and Drucker 2012).  Pretty (2003) argues that where there is a strong social norm, 
individuals have confidence to invest in pro-social activities, knowing that others will do so too. 
Middler et.al. (2015) identified that collective incentives have a positive effect on conservation 
only when social ties are strong. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of individual versus collective payment schemes 
in promoting conservation using a framed field experiment. We assess the response to PES 
schemes and disentangle heterogeneous effects of individual and collective schemes.  In 
addition, we explore to what extend the behavior of others, or the unwritten social norms, help 
to enhance conservation under under individual and collective incentive schemes.  
 
As case study, we focus on Indonesia which has the third largest area of tropical rainforest in 
the world after the Amazon and Congo Basins (Fitzherbert et al. 2008).  Despite its reputation 
as a global biodiversity hotspot, the country is also known as one of the top three greenhouse 
gas emitters from deforestation worldwide, partly due to  the expansion of oil palm cultivation 
(Sloan, Edwards, and Laurance 2012; Carlson et al. 2012). It is estimated that 53 percent of 
the total area planted with oil palm in Indonesia is the result of deforestation since 1989 (Vijay 
et al. 2016). In response, the Government of Indonesia has started more than 60 REDD+ 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) activities, being one of them 
the provision of monetary incentives to reduce land conversion and promote sustainable forest 
management (FCPF 2018). In this regard, this study provides insights on farmers’ response 
to different PES schemes to foster environmentally friendly behavior associated with the 
cultivation of rubber agroforestry.   
 
Our framed field experiment is based on Vorlaufer et al. (2017).  Participants decide how to 
allocate their endowment of land between two alternative products commonly grown in the 
region: rubber agroforestry and oil palm plantations. Replicating actual trade-offs in the land 
allocation decisions, we set the experiment such that cultivation in oil palm yields higher 
returns than the cultivation of rubber agroforestry.  Yet, to capture the effects that rubber 
agroforestry generates on the environment (e.g., soil conservation, biodiversity habitat, etc.), 
we allow positive externalities to the cultivation of rubber agroforestry.   
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To examine how heterogeneity in endowments and in returns affects conservation decisions, 
we vary the endowment of land that individuals in a group receive. Two individuals are low 
endowed and receive 5 units of land and one individual is high endowed and receives 10 units.  
We extended this experiment to include a between subject design, where participants took 
identical land allocation decisions but under an alternative incentive schemes.  The incentive 
was framed as Payment for Environmental Services aiming to foster environmentally friendly 
behavior associated with the cultivation of rubber agroforestry.   
 
We experimentally vary two characteristics of the scheme.  We implemented either an 
individual or collective incentive scheme and under each scheme we offered a low and a high 
incentive.  Under the individual scheme, participants received the payment individually for 
each unit of endowment individually allocated to conservation.  In the collective incentive 
scheme, participants received the incentive based on their individual allocation, but only once 
the total number of land units allocated to the conservation of rubber agroforestry at the group 
level reached a minimum threshold level.    
 
We find a significant proportion of the endowment of land (40 percent) is devoted to rubber 
agroforestry. As expected farmers with high endowments invest a significantly larger fraction 
of their land endowments (52 percent) compared to low endowed individuals (45 percent) 
under individual schemes.  We find that PES are effective at promoting conservation. 
However, the elasticity of supply is relatively low.  A one percent increase in the payments 
leads to a 0.02 percent increase in the area conserved.  Comparing individual and collective 
incentives, we find that they are equally effective at promoting conservation on the average.  
 
There are many studies analyzing the effect of PES but relatively few studies exploring the 
response to individual and collective PES schemes.  Midler et al. (2015) analyze collective 
and individual types of PES schemes with and without communication.  Supporting the 
importance of social norms, they find that collective incentive promotes conservation only 
when social ties are strong (number of family members in the same session) or when 
communication was allowed.  More recently, Kaczan et al (2017) showed that collective 
incentives increase the time contribution for conservation practices.  We contribute to the 
literature by explicitly considering how heterogeneity in land endowments and the interaction 
of monetary incentives with network behavior affects farmer’s pro-environmental behavior 
under PES schemes.   
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There is limited literature concerning land use heterogeneity providing recommendations for 
the design of payments for environmental services. In terms of PES geographical focus, Eloy 
(2012) performed an analysis of land use heterogeneity in agricultural frontiers in the 
Amazonia showing that PES policies should focus on remote areas, where the initial stage of 
deforestation usually takes place, where the agro ecosystem fertility and agro biodiversity are 
already high and where farmers are younger and poorer (Eloy et al. 2012). With regards to 
response to incentives considering land heterogeneity,  Vorlaufer et al. (2017) show that 
farmers with low land endowment (poor) reacted more strongly to PES than farmers with high 
endowment (rich).  In the same line, Keser (2014) found that when there are strong 
asymmetries in endowment, high endowed (rich) participants contribute significantly lower 
percentage than low-endowed (poor) participants (Keser et al. 2014).  Yet, these studies do 
not compare different PES schemes.   
 
This paper also contributes to the literature studying the how social norms affect the 
effectiveness of PES.  Barr et al (2012) study the role of trust, group membership and networks 
in an individual incentive scheme. They found that trust and group membership positively 
reinforce individual participation while the presence within a reciprocal fishing dependency 
network reduces the likelihood of participation. Similarly, Chen et. al. (2009) found that 
farmer’s intention to re-enroll in the Grain-to-Green Program in China decreased if they 
observed reconversion to non-green technologies among their neighbors.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two provides background and context in terms of 
previous PES in Indonesia and the importance of the region. In Section three, we present the 
literature review on the empirical evidence about social norms and network, PES and 
environmental outcomes. Section four presents the theoretical framework of the investment 
game; followed by section five, where details of the empirical data are presented.  In Section 
six, we present descriptive statistics followed by the econometric results. Finally, in Section 
seven, we discussed the implications of the findings at the policy level with regards to natural 
resources management initiatives in Indonesia and the design of PES in general. 
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2. Conceptual framework 
We consider the individual decision on land use.   Each individual i has ℯ& units of land which 
we refer to as hectares. Their task is to decide how to allocate the endowment between oil 
palm and rubber agroforestry. We denote F& the number of units that are invested in rubber 
agroforestry and consider that the land that is not invested in rubber agroforestry is invested 
in oil palm   (ℯ& −	F&). Acknowledging the existence of multiple types of individuals as a core 
principle of modeling collective behavior (Ostrom 2007), we consider that producers are 
heterogeneous in terms of size of available land. Therefore, we have low-endowed individuals, 
L, with  ℯ'	 units of land and high endowed individuals, H, with ℯ(  units of land.   
Consistent with the fact that the cultivation of rubber agroforestry generates positive 
environmental effects (i.e. host lowland biodiversity, carbon storage, improve water quality, 
among others) we consider that each unit invested in rubber agroforestry generates a positive 
externality, β, to the members of the group.  In addition, consistent with the fact that rubber 
agroforestry has lower economic returns than oil palm (Djanibekov and Villamor 2017), we set 
the marginal return generated by each hectare of oil palm to 1, while the marginal return from 
one hectare of rubber agroforestry is set to I<1.  We further allow different marginal returns 
for low and high-endowed individuals.  We assume that low-endowed individuals are less 
productive in rubber-agroforestry than high-endowed individuals and set  I' < I( ..   
 
To account for the possibility that individuals internalize the cost that cultivating oil palm 
generates to nature, similar to Ibanez and Martinsson (2010) we assume that individuals 
disutility from cultivating oil palm is 3 = D&(ℯ&) −	F&*)"  Where D& denotes a parameter that 
measures the importance that individual i gives to conservation. For an individual who does 
not care about conservation, D& = 0.  Whereas for an individual who gives importance to the 
environment D& > 0.   
The individual’s utility function O& 	is given by:  




where R = {?, U}. 
 
Taking as given the investment decisions of others, F+ , the marginal incentive to invest in 
rubber agroforestry is: 
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=	−1 + I* + 2c.(ℯ&) −	F&*)	  
 
Because the marginal return from oil palm is higher than from rubber agroforestry, the model 
predicts that an individual who does not care about conservation will allocate all the 
endowment to oil palm instead of rubber agroforestry (F&∗ = 0).   Alternatively, for an individual 
who cares sufficiently about conservation such that  01!"02!# = 0 we will have an interior solution 
where the investment in rubber agroforestry is: 
 
F&* =




Hence, the units of land in rubber agroforestry will increase as individuals give more 
importance to the environment, have more land endowments and have higher marginal return 
from cultivating rubber agroforestry.  From this condition, we derive our first hypothesis: 
 
H1. The proportion of land invested in rubber agroforestry is larger for high-endowed 
individuals compared to low endowed individuals. 
 
The basic decision problem is extended to investigate the effectiveness of different institutional 
designs of PES. The first design that we consider is one in which PES are offered to each 
individual.  For each unit of land invested in rubber agroforestry, participants receive I*+ PES.  
Individual's utility is:  





As shown in Vorlaufer et al. (2017) an individual payment is predicted to increase the likelihood 
that an individual invests in rubber agroforestry.  In addition, conditional on positive 
investments, PES increases the amount of endowment that individuals invest in agroforestry. 
For individuals who care about the environment, ]01!"02!# = 0^, the marginal effect of an increase 
in PES is: 
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Hence, the model predicts that the response to the incentive is independent on the endowment 
of land.  
 
The second design considers a collective incentive. Under this scheme, n community 
members receive a payment PES conditional on achieving a specified target level of 
conservation. If the total area conversed by the community is larger than a pre-specified 
threshold T (∑ F&*,&-! ≥ " ) the individual i receives the incentive independently on her 
conservation decisions.  In this case, ∑ F&*,&-! ≥ " individual's utility is given by Equation 
Error! Reference source not found..  If the threshold is not reached, no community member 
receives the payment.  In this case individual’s utility is given by Equation Error! Reference 
source not found..  Participants expected utility of investing in rubber agroforestry depends 
on the subjective probability, pi, that individual assigns that the group reaches the threshold 
level.  We assume that individuals have rational expectations and that the expected probability 
depends on individual's experience on how much community members invest in rubber 
agroforestry.  
 
It is straightforward to show that compared with the individual incentive, collective incentives 
have a lower effect on the likelihood that individuals invest in rubber agroforestry and the 
amount of land that is devoted to rubber agroforestry. The marginal effect of PES for 







	 (9)  
 
Based on this extension of the basic model we derive the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: Under collective incentives the effect of PES on conservation would be lower than under 
individual incentives. The effect of PES is independent of endowment of land. 
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H3. Conservation behavior is dependent on the individual’s expected investment of network 
members.  As more network members cultivate rubber agroforestry, more land is allocated to 
rubber agroforestry under collective incentives but not under individual incentives.  
3. Background 
Indonesia spreads over more than 18,000 islands; with around 60% of the territory being 
located in tropical rainforest.  Due to the high levels of endemic species and rich biodiversity, 
this country is of worldwide environmental importance (Waltert, Mardiastuti, and Mühlenberg 
2004). Oil palm plantations cover approximately 8 million hectares in Indonesia and it is 
expected that they will reach about 13 million hectares by 2020 (Cacho et al. 2014). The 
establishment of oil palm and timber plantations have now become the main drivers of 
deforestation in Indonesia (Cacho et al. 2014; Koh and Wilcove 2008). The increasing world 
demand for crude palm oil and the national policies on biofuels requiring either ethanol or 
palm-oil biodiesel in the fuel mix suggest that expansion of oil palm plantations will continue 
(Dillon et al. 2008).  Much of the production in Indonesia comes from large-scale plantations, 
however, independent smallholders are increasing their share and may dominate production 
in the future.  
 
PES are regarded as a promising policy instrument to foster conservation and promote 
alternative agroforestry systems such as rubber agroforest (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; 
Muradian et al. 2010; Muradian 2013; Börner et al. 2017). Rubber agroforest represents a 
traditional, extensive management system, which is established by inter-planting rubber trees 
with native fruit and timber trees. Rubber agroforest can rapidly develop a vegetation structure 
close to that of secondary forest of similar age (Ekadinata, Widayati, and Vincent 2004) and 
therefore generates positive environmental effects (i.e. improved water quality, increased soil 
fertility and higher biodiversity). 
 
Indonesia has implemented PES instruments to promote the provision of water and carbon 
sequestration services in the Bungo watershed and Lake Singkarak (Adhikari and Agrawal 
2013).  Farmers who protect upper watersheds and avoid planned deforestation or increase 
tree planting have benefited from these schemes (Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal 2014; Lapeyre, 
Pirard, and Leimona 2015; Suich et al. 2017).  Under this scheme, the community leaders 
certify compliance with conservation goals.  The success of the mechanisms has been 
associated with increased coordination by publically agreeing expected behavior.  
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Furthermore, social sanctions for not compliance  are expected to foster compliance (Coleman 
1987).   
 
Kerr et al (2014) examined the “Hutan Kamasyarakatan (HKm) Social Forestry Program”, 
which offered an in-kind individual incentive (probationary land right) in exchange for 
watershed protection. Participation was on a voluntary basis but required individuals to be part 
of an organized group, which guaranteed compliance at the individual level. The Social 
Forestry Program was considered a success because most farmers did not have land security 
and the option of having a provisional land right was incentive enough to protect the 
watershed; in addition, farmers had the possibility to extend this land right permit for a 25-year 
period after the first five years. Nowadays, land rights have been granted for longer period (25 
years) and are no longer an in-kind incentive.  
 
The result of this study are particularly relevant as the Indonesian Government has started 
more than 60 REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 
activities, being one of them the provision of monetary incentives to reduce land conversion 
and promote sustainable forest management (FCPF 2018). In our study area, the Jambi 
province, these incentives are yet to be implemented. 
 
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies that analyze the conservation outcomes of 
collective schemes under different payment levels and therefore this study provides insights 
on farmers’ response to different PES schemes to foster environmentally friendly behavior 
associated with the cultivation of rubber agroforestry. 
  
4. Experimental design and procedure 
The experimental design aims at testing the effectiveness of different institutional designs of 
PES to foster conservation decisions. We formed random and anonymous groups of three 
participants (n=3). Two participants in the group were randomly assigned to receive an 
endowment ℯ'= 5 and one participant received  ℯ(= 10. The participants’ task was then to 
decide how to allocate their endowment between oil palm and rubber agroforestry. The 
scenarios reproduce the investment decision presented in the theoretical model (I' <	I( <
1).  Considering the estimates by Feintrenie et al. (2010) of rubber agroforestry and oil palm 
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productivity in Jambi province, we set the marginal return of rubber agroforestry of low-
endowed participants to I' = 	0.5, and for high-endowed participants to I( = 	0.6.  
 
Participants were explained about the positive externalities of rubber agroforestry and how 
this system contributes to habitat for biodiversity, carbon sequestration. In our experiment, we 
emphasize that by their decision on allocating hectares to rubber agroforestry they will be 
benefiting group members.  Assigning a value to the externality is challenging due to the 
complex relationships between land management, biodiversity and fluctuations in ecological 
services, (Pascual and Perrings 2007).  As far as we are aware, there is no economic valuation 
of the effects of rubber agroforestry on the environment.  For the experiment, we let each 
experimental unit of land cultivated with rubber agroforestry generate a value of β=0.2.   
 
In the experiment we use a between-within subject design that varies the type of incentive 
scheme and the payment level across two payment sets (Table 4). In the within subject design, 
each participant was presented with three decisions that vary the value of the incentive. In the 
first decision the incentive is set to zero (baseline without PES); the second and third decisions 
correspond to either a low or a high incentive depending on the order randomly pre-determined 
for the session. In the between subject design, we tested two different types of PES, individual 
and collective, and implemented two different payment sets. While under the individual 
incentive scheme, participants received a flat-rate payment for each experimental land unit 
allocated to rubber agroforestry, under the collective scheme, payment is conditional on the 
achievement of an aggregate conservation threshold. We set the threshold level at T=7, 
corresponding to 35% of the aggregate land endowment at group level. Table 4 presents an 
overview of the parameters used in the experiment.   


















)$ = 5 $$ = 	0.5 0.05 0.2
5 
0.1 0.3 0.2 88 22 
)% = 10 $% = 	0.6 0.05 0.2
5 
0.1 0.3 0.2 44 22 
Collective 
incentive  
)$ = 5 $$ = 	0.5 0.05 0.2
5 
0.1 0.3 0.2 76 18 
)% = 10 $% = 	0.6 0.05 0.2
5 
0.1 0.3 0.2 38 20 
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The experiment was implemented from November 2012 until March 2013. The participants 
were randomly invited to participate in the experiment based on a village census. At the start 
of the session, the instructions of the game were read aloud to the participants, followed by 
several examples. To improve understanding of the rules of the game, we worked with 
visualizations and to illustrate investment decisions, participants were presented with pictures 
from oil palm and rubber agroforestry systems. The endowment with experimental land units 
was represented by color stickers. After completion of two practice rounds, the actual 
experiment was carried out. Participants did not receive feedback on investment decisions of 
other group members and communication was not allowed throughout the session.  
 
In total 30 experimental sessions were carried out, 16 with the individual incentive scheme 
and 14 with the collective incentive scheme. Each experimental session had between 2 and 
3 groups, with a total of 246 participants and 82 groups from which 44 groups participated in 
the individual incentive scheme and 38 in the collective incentive scheme.   On average, 
participants earned 86,347 Rp, which is equivalent to one to two daily wages in the research 
area. A post experimental questionnaire was applied to gather information concerning 
individual socio-economic characteristics, perception of fairness towards the payment, 
reasons behind their decision on planting oil palm and rubber agroforestry, number of family 
members that participated in the same session, number of participants in the same session 
known by name, and the number of participants in the same session with whom the participant 
has interacted in the last month.   
 
In addition, as illustrated in Equation Error! Reference source not found. the subjective 
probability, pi, that individual assigns depends on the individual's experience on how much 
community members invest in rubber agroforestry.  In order to capture individual’s experience 
on how much its community invest in rubber agroforestry, a socioeconomic survey including 
questions with regard to social norms and network was performed. The survey applied the 
random matching within sample technique (Maertens and Barrett, 2013), where each farmer 
was matched with nine randomly drawn individuals from the sample in each village and, for 
each match, we elicit details of the relationship between the farmer and the match. Based on 
Conley and Udry (2001) and Maertens and Barrett (2013), we include questions such as: do 
you know farmer X?, when did you last talk with X?, in a normal month, how often do you talk 
to X?, Does X plant oil palm, rubber monoculture or rubber agroforest? and how many 
hectares does X cultivate?. Since the matching was random, these measures give us an 
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indication of the farmer’s social connectedness within the community and his perceptions 
regarding the cultivation activities of his social network members.  We use the responses to 
these questions to capture the subjective probability that the farmer attaches to other 
community members investing in rubber agroforestry.     
5. Estimation approach 
In order to analyze the effect of individual and collective schemes on conservation behavior, 
we define as dependent variable the share of the total endowment allocated to rubber 
agroforestry. Thus, the model we estimate is the following:  
 
e&4 = $5 + $6"& + $789/02&4 +	$6:789(	"& 	5	/02&4)	+	f&;$ + 2&;β +		>&	 +	C&4 (10)  
   
Where, e&4 is the conservation outcome by participant @ in decision +. T is a dummy that takes 
value equal to one if the collective scheme was implemented and zero otherwise, PES is the 
value of the incentive that was offered to participants (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.30).  Our coefficient 
of interest is $6:789 . Our hypothesis is that this coefficient is negative indicating that 
participants respond less to the collective than to the individual incentive. The vectors X and 
S represent socioeconomic characteristics and social norm and network variables, while 
>& 	stands for the idiosyncratic error term and C&4 is the residual.  With regards to 2&; we include 
the characteristics of the farmer’s network with regards to the aggregate level of environmental 
connectedness from his/her network, number of people from his/her network that cultivates 
rubber agroforestry and number of people from his/her network that cultivates oil palm. In 
addition we consider how much weight a farmer gives to act like others and to comply with the 
social norm. We expect that farmers refer to their social network to derive predictions on how 
their group members will behave and what the social norm is; for example, a farmer with a 
larger network cultivating oil palm is expected to invest less in rubber agroforestry under the 
collective incentive scheme (Hypothesis 3) while it should not affect investment under the 
individual PES. 
 
To disentangle heterogeneous effects by land-endowment we define as dependent variable 
the individual share of the total endowment allocated to rubber agroforestry. Thus, the model 
we estimate is the following: 
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e& = $5 + $789/02& +	$*:89(	R& 	5	/02&4)	+	f&;$ + 2&;β +		>&	 +	C&4 (11)  
 
Where, e is the conservation outcome by participant @. K is a dummy that takes value equal 
to one if the individual was endowed with ten hectares and zero otherwise, PES is the value 
of the incentive that was offered to participants (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.30).  Our coefficients of 
interest are $89 and $*:789 which compare the response of low and high endowed individuals 
to PES, respectively.  Our hypothesis is that $789	will be positive. The model predicts that 
$*:789   will be not significantly different from zero, indicating that low and high endowed 
individuals react similarly to PES.  The vectors X and S represent socioeconomic 
characteristics and social norm and network variables, while >& 	stands for the idiosyncratic 
error term and C&4 is the residual.    
 
To account for the panel structure of the data, we estimate a Generalized Least squares (GLS) 
random effects model.  Although our dependent variable ranges between 0 and 1, it is 
distributed normally justifying the use of this model. 
6. Results 
 Descriptive statistics 
From the total sample of farmers, 54% were assigned to the individual incentive scheme and 
46% to the collective incentive scheme. The socioeconomic characteristics of the participants 
in the study are comparable across villages. The balance across sample for individual and 
collective treatment shows no significant differences with regards to age, education and size 
of the farm. Farmers are on average 43.78 years old with successful completion of elementary 
school (six years of education) but have not finalized secondary school (Table 5). Participants 
of the two treatments do not differ in terms of area of oil palm cultivated and the size of the 
farm. The crop that is cultivated more commonly by the participants is oil palm, followed by 
rubber and small portion with rubber agroforestry. On average 86 percent of the participants 
have as main occupation agriculture. 
 
The results of the random matching within sample technique showed that farmers on the 
average know four people that cultivate rubber agroforestry and six people that cultivate oil 
palm; the level of education of the network is on average 7.45 years of schooling. In general, 
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the network has the same pattern of cultivation, being oil palm the predominant crop, followed 





Table 5. Summary Statistics and balance check   
Variables Mean S.D. 








Age 43.79 11.01 43.73 43.88 0.51 
Sex (=1 if female) 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.48 
Education (=years of schooling) 7.70 3.73 7.65 7.75 0.48 
Size of the farm (has) 3.84 6.00 3.21 4.65 0.47 




3.46 1.98 2.78 0.46 




1.91 0.31 0.34 0.48 
Main occupation (=1 if it is agriculture else 0) 0.86 0.35 0.88 0.82 0.53 
Individual environmental perception  0.81 0.39 0.83 0.79 0.52 
      
Family members in the same session 1.03 1.68 1.20 0.83 0.55 
People known by name in the same session  7.24 1.50 7.53 6.91 0.00 
People with whom the participant speaks at 
least once per month in the same session 
3.80 2.54 4.08 3.53 0.33 
      
Social rubber agroforestry network   4.47 3.13 4.41 4.52 0.82 
Social oil palm network      6.83 2.02 6.81 6.88 0.76 
Environmental connectedness of the network   5.53 1.01 5.49 5.59 0.59 
Stated commitment to comply and be 
consistent with the social norm (=1 if yes) 
0.70 0.45 0.73 0.68 0.53 
1 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. S.D. stands for Standard Deviation  
 
In addition, we observed high environmental connectedness of the network (5.53 out of 7) and 
around 70 percent of the participants stated that they have and will behave to comply and be 
consistent with the social norm.  
 
The response from the participants in the experiment at the group level is displayed in Figure 
3. The figure shows the mean share allocated to conservation at the group level by treatment 
and payment set.  The lines represent the confidence intervals. There are initial differences in 
the share allocated to conservation among payment sets for individual payments (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p<0.10). This suggests that in the econometric analysis we need to control for 
payment set.  We also find that the share conserved increases with higher PES.  Figure 3 
shows that at baseline (no incentive), on average 40 to 48 percent of the land is invested in 
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conservation.  The share increases when participants are offered a PES, at low incentives, 
0.05 and 0.10, the share increases by 4.5 percent and high incentives, 0.25 and 0.30, the 
share increases by 6.5 percent compared to the average of the baseline respectively.   
  
Figure 3.  Mean group share allocated to conservation 
 
 Collective versus individual scheme 
To test the effect of individual and collective schemes on conservation behavior we analyze 
the proportion of total endowment allocated to rubber agroforestry at the group level (Group 
share). We estimate equation 8 for the pooled sample controlling for session dummies with 
clustered standard errors at the session level (Table 6). We find that when there are no 
incentives 45 percent of endowment is invested in rubber agroforestry.  This indicates that 
participant have high concerns for the environment, assigning a high moral cost from investing 
in oil palm.  PES has a positive although small effect on conservation. 
Table 6. Random effects GLS estimation for share of land conserved at the group level   
 
 (1) 
 Group share of land 
conserved 
Coef. S.E. 
PES Incentive 0.002 * 0.001 
Treatment (=1 if collective) -0.013 0.056 
Collective * PES incentive 0.000 0.001 
Constant 0.453 *** 0.028 
N 246  
chi2 8.494  
P 0.037  




















Set 0 Set 1 Set 0 Set 1
Individual scheme Collective scheme
0 0.050.10 0.250.30
Set 0                                                                   Set 1
PES incentives offered
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PES Incentive + Collective*PES incentive 0.002 ** 0.0010 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
A one percent increase in incentives increases investments in rubber agroforestry by 0.17 
percentual points under individual incentives and by 0.23 percentual points under collective 
incentives.  Yet, as indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term, this difference is not 
statistically significant.  Hence we reject H2 stating that the elasticity of supply to PES is lower 
under collective than under individual incentive schemes.  This unexpected result could 
indicate that individual asign a high probability or receive the incentive under collective 
incentive, or that they expect that the other participants would invest sufficiently in rubber 
agroforestry to receive the PES.   
 Heterogeneous effects   
There has been little attention to asymmetry in endowment in the experiments when analyzing 
individual or collective PES schemes. The opportunity costs of allocating scarce resources to 
conservation are often significant for resource users with limited endowments (Narloch, 
Pascual, and Drucker 2012), as is the case for our low-endowed participants.  In this study, 
we test whether conservation behavior under individual and collective schemes differs by 
endowment level (Table 7). For this purpose, we estimate equation 9 separately by individual 
and collective scheme and interacted endowment level with the PES incentive (model 2 and 
3).  
 
Results from model 2 show that in the absence of PES, individuals with high endowment of 
land invest a larger proportion of the endowent in rubber agroforestry.  Yet, the results of 
model 3, indicate the opposite. Therefore we  reject Hypothesis 1, stating that individuals with 
larger endowments invest a larger proportion of land in conservation. 
 
Model 2 indicate that payments significantly increased conservation among low endowed 
participants. Yet the elasticity is relatively small and a one percent increase in PES increases 
the endowment invested in rubber agroforestry in only 0.3 percentual points (p<0.1). In 
contrast, among high endowed participants the effect, given by the linear combination of 
coefficients is in fact not significantly different from zero (p>0.10) as predicted by the model.   
 
Under the collective scheme, PES significantly increases conservation among low endowed 
participants, although the size of the effect is small. A one percent increase in PES increases 
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land conserve in only 0.1 percentual points  (p<0.05). The effect of PES on land conservation 
from high endowed participants is slightly larger (0.3 percentual points, p<0.10). Thus, the 
results indicate that the two types of PES schemes have the same effect on participants with 
different land endowments.  
 
Table 7. Random effect GLS estimation of individual share of land allocated to rubber agroforestry 
Variables 









Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Endowment (=1 if 
10has) 
0.110* 0.059 -0.119* 0.075  0.091 0.057     -0.082 0.074 
PES Incentive  0.003* 0.002 0.001* 0.001     
High-endowed X 
PES incentive 
-0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002     
         
Level of PES          
Low (0.05-0.1)       0.027 0.021 0.066*** 0.021 
High (0.25-0.30)     0.066** 0.029 0.076*** 0.020 
         
Constant 0.352** 0.145 0.329 0.234 0.356** 0.147      0.285 0.236 
N 382  306  382               
306 
382 
chi2 49.92  30.007  27.274  34.228 27.274 
P  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.000 0.002 
Note: All models control for age, sex, education, land tenure, family members, people known by name and people with whom the participant speak 
in the last month in the same session. Standard errors are clustered at the session level.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
To analyze if the effectiveness of the two schemes is conditional on whether high or low 
incentives are offered9 we aggregate the average share of land from the two lower (0.05 and 
0.1) and from the two higher (0.25 and 0.30) discrete PES offered. The results indicate that 
under the individual scheme low incentives were not sufficient to alter the farmer’s behavior in 
comparison with the baseline (no incentive scenario).  However, high incentives increase the 
individual share of land allocated to rubber agroforestry by 6.1 percentual points  compared 
to the baseline.  This means that although conservation levels can be achieved with individual 




9 As mentioned in the experimental procedure, we offer four discretional PES levels 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.30. 
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In contrast, low incentives under the collective scheme have a positive and significant 
influence on conservation behavior increasing the share of land allocated to rubber 
agroforestry by 6.0 percentual points. High incentives also have a significant and positive 
effect under the collective scheme, although the size of the effect (6.8 percentual points) is 
not much larger than with low incentives. Thus, as regards cost-effectiveness, collective 
incentives may offer the opportunity to achieve similar conservation outcomes at lower cost.   
 
 PES interaction with social norm and network characteristics 
Social interactions are critical within collective processes (Kaczan et al. 2017), in this regard 
we analyze the effect of the participants’ network characteristics and the stated disposition to 
act according to the social norm and their interaction with the incentives. Table 8 shows that 
characteristics related to the participant’s social network have a significant influence on the 
conservation behavior mainly under the collective scheme, supporting Hypothesis 3. Individual 
characteristics are more prominent when PES area offered under individual schemes. 
 
Under the collective scheme, we observed the size of the social agroforestry network and the 
environmental perception of the network having a positive effect, increasing the share of land 
conserved by 24 and 6 percentual points respectively. In addition, we observe the negative 
effect of having a large oil palm network and a high compliance with the norm, implying that 
an additional person in the social oil palm network of the participant reduces the share of land 
allocated to rubber agroforest by 4 percentual points and the more willing a participant is to 
comply with what the social norm establishes, his contribution is reduced by 16 percentual 
points. This negative effect could be explain in two ways: 1) participants want to perform as 
the social norm in the area, which is the cultivation of oil palm and feel pressure to comply 
with the norm; and 2) in real life, individuals consider the behavior of others   to predict the 
probability of conservation from the group members. 
Table 8. Random effect GLS estimation of individual share of land allocated to rubber agroforestry   
(6) (7) 
Variables Individual Collective  
Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E 
PES incentive -0.00536 0.00
4 
0.00483    0.00
6 
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Variables Individual Collective  
Coef.  S.E. Coef. S.E 
Individual characteristics     
Individual environmental perception 0.10671*** 0.03
9 
-0.05551    0.05
8 




     
Social network characteristics 
    










Environmental perception of the network -0.01207 0.02
3 
0.06471*   0.03
8 
Social Oil palm network -0.02568** 0.01
1 
-0.04563**  0.01
9      
Interactions 
    






PES * Social Oil palm  network -0.00062 0.00
1 
-0.00017    0.00
0 




-0.00120    0.00
2 
PES *Environmental perception of the network  0.00186** 0.00
1 
-0.00017    0.00
1 
Constant  0.52212** 0.23
5 
0.54140    0.42
9 
Note: All models control for age, sex, education, land tenure, family members, people known by name and people with whom the participant speak 
in the last month in the same session. Standard errors are clustered at the session level.   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
Considering that economic incentives for conservation influence moral motivations for 
conservation through their interaction with social preferences (Liu et al. 2014). We consider 
the interaction of the PES incentive with the social network characteristics. We find that in the 
collective scheme once the incentive is offered having a network that cultivate agroforestry 
positively influences conservation behavior and slightly increases land allocated to 
agroforestry by 0.9 percentual points; this effect is inverse under the individual incentive where 
the land allocated to conservation is reduced in 0.4 percentual points.  
 
Individual environmental perception plays an important role under the individual scheme 
increasing the land allocated to conservation by 10%, under the collective scheme there is not 
effect. Once the incentive is offered, we observe a small positive and significant effect of 
environmental connectedness of the network under the individual scheme, meaning that when 
deciding to cultivate rubber agroforestry due to the positive environmental externalities, the 
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participant’s land investment decision takes into consideration that his network is conscious 
about the environment.  
7. Conclusions 
Payment for Environmental Services is an instrument that provides incentives for 
conservation.  We analyze the effectiveness of individual and collective incentives and find 
that both types of schemes are effective at increasing conservation, though the impact is 
relatively small. A one percent increase in PES increases conservation in only 2 percentual 
points or three percent of the investment.   
Our findings contribute to the discussion in terms of individual versus collective PES schemes, 
specifically showing that collective schemes can be as effective as individual schemes.. The 
results indicate that collective schemes can be more cost-effective because it achieves 
conservation outcome at lower incentive payments and engage large landowners, who may 
feel the moral pressure to contribute their share under such institutional arrangements. While 
smaller farmers respond to individual and collective incentives, their contribution is slightly 
larger under the individual scheme (0.3%) compared to the collective scheme (0.1%).  In areas 
where transaction costs are not so high and the prevalence is small patches from small 
farmers, individual schemes could achieve higher conservation outcomes; while in critical 
areas with large farmers collective schemes might be more suitable. 
 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the effectiveness of PES is highly place-specific and 
depends on the social norms prevalent in the communities. The analysis of the social network 
characteristics and its interaction with PES incentives highlights the fact that the adequacy 
and efficiency of a specific scheme partly depends on the social norms and network 
characteristics of the area. In contexts where farmers are highly committed to what his close 
network does as a whole, such as the case of our study area where the social norm is the 
cultivation of oil palm, higher monetary incentives are required to compensate the opportunity 
costs forgone for a crop such as oil palm.  
 
The positive and significant effect of the social agroforestry network opens a door of 
opportunities and strategies to promote pro-conservation behavior. Acknowledging that 
financial resources are not always available to fully compensate farmers for not cultivating oil 
palm, strategies based on the social context could complement the monetary incentives, 
promoting good reputation, engaging with productive associations to encourage their 
Chapter 3. Social capital and conservation under collective and individual incentive schemes: a 






members to become more environmentally friendly can stimulate change in behavior.  This 
understanding is important in order to provide policymakers with key aspects when designing 
PES, especially the messaging that monetary incentives are not a single solution for such a 
complex problem, and that a holistic approach in defining strategies that contemplates not 
only monetary aspects but also key features from the close social network of the farmer can 
achieve a higher impact. 
 
This study highlights how endowment heterogeneity and social network can affect the success 
of PES schemes.  Further research could analyze higher levels of PES under both schemes, 
providing insights into the discussion of appropriateness of monetary incentives aiming at 
reducing cultivation of high profitable crops. In addition, analysis comparing monetary vs social 
incentives and the long-term effect could provide insights on which strategies are more 
efficient, considering limited resources   to finance monetary incentives. 
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Chapter 4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this dissertation we show that social capital plays an important role in adoption of 
sustainable practices in the agricultural sector.  In one hand, we provide empirical evidence 
about the significant and positive influence of social capital variables on the level of perceived 
control and intention to perform adoption of pressurized irrigation. In the other, we show that 
social capital, in the form of network, could negatively influence conservation behavior when 
the social norm is to cultivate the more profitable crop as in the case of oil palm in Indonesia.  
 
1. Main findings  
Social capital is a key concept to unveil complex decision-making processes nonetheless, 
when we combined social capital with TPB we observed significant effects of social capital on 
cognitive elements that otherwise would not have been possible to measure.  
 
We applied the concept of social capital jointly with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to 
identify factors that influence adoption of pressurized irrigation. We provide evidence that TPB 
is a framework to identify beliefs that are affecting attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
control, which consequently affect decisions through intentions. The literature often uses 
social capital to explain behavior directly. Here, we explore different pathways through which 
social capital may affect adoption and find that key elements such as networks and trust, 
influence adoption indirectly through the TPB construct. Although there is not a direct effect 
on adoption, they are important because they influence significantly psychological cognitive 
constructs that affect intention and actual behavior. For instance, network has a strong 
influence on perceived control. The farmer is more confident in performing the behavior the 
larger his network that has already implemented the technology. Therefore, social capital is 
relevant because it allows farmers to exchange and ask for help in case of need.  
 






Similarly, we find that socio-demographic variables are not directly related to decisions of 
adoption but have an indirect effect through intention. Extension services had not significant 
effect on adoption, but its effects are large on perceived control.  
 
A key finding in the context of Chile is that attitudes are high and positive towards the 
technology, but it did not show a significant effect on intention. Therefore, investment should 
target networks and water organizations that help to establish the social norms and can create 
this informal rule of implementing sustainable practices. 
 
Now, when analyzing social capital in a context of PES schemes in Indonesia. We find that 
individuals were more susceptible to social capital variables under collective schemes than in 
the individual scheme. Social capital in the form of network shows a negative and significant 
influence of the share of land allocated to rubber agroforestry, while membership and 
environmental awareness of the network have a positive influence. In the individual scheme 
were more relevant individual characteristics such as individual environmental perception, 
land tenure and if the participant cultivates rubber agroforestry.  
 
The effect of social network, when comparing both case studies reaffirms the need to design 
strategies that are context specific and that consider the social dynamics of each site. PES 
schemes are external formal institutions that need to take into consideration the informal rules 
of the community and the characteristics of the network in order to achieve the desire 
outcomes.  Network is relevant because it strengthens and rule out the social norms in the 
community, the farmer gives weight to what the network expect him to do. Nonetheless, when 
analyzing specifically adoption of a technology, network becomes more important as a window 
of support, flow of information, and access to financing that makes the process of adoption 
easier. 
 
Another key finding is that collective schemes can be as effective as individual schemes, as 
we observed a positive and significant increase on conservation outcomes. Collective 
schemes can be more cost-effective because it achieves same conservation outcome at lower 
incentive payments. Contrary to the findings in previous experiments, collective schemes do 
not undermine intrinsic motivations for conservation. 
 






In addition, the results show that land heterogeneity matters, collective schemes may be 
especially suitable to engage large landowners, who may feel the moral pressure to contribute 
their share under such institutional arrangements. While smaller farmers respond to individual 
and collective incentives. It should be kept in mind, however, that the effectiveness of PES is 
highly place-specific and depends on the social norms prevalent in the communities.  
2. Policy implications 
Our empirical results have important policy implications. In the case study from Chile, we 
identified that attitude campaigns are not enough to influence intentions. The government 
could target and change the norm of superficial irrigation by convincing people of core beliefs 
associated with water conservation awareness and to boost farmer’s trust in water 
organizations that could foster cooperation to adopt pressurized irrigation systems as a norm.  
In addition, extension services should focus on generating exchange of knowledge through 
social networks to facilitate action and increase farmers’ perceived self-confidence about 
performing the change from superficial to pressurized irrigation; in this context this is more 
important than improving attitudes towards the technology.  
 
In the case study in Indonesia with regards to Payment for Environmental Services, our 
findings have important implications for REDD focus countries, which is the most important 
arena for collective PES nowadays. Policy makers can build up on existing social norms; 
provide economic incentives for conservation and complement informal institutions. Future 
PES should focus and be tailor to the characteristics of the participants in terms of endowment 
and should have a better understanding of the social norms of the context.  
3. Limitations and ideas for further research 
There are some factors that limit the scope of the study. In this section I highlight the major 
limitations and provide ideas for further research.  
 
First, in Chapter 2 we estimate an integral model that considers the effects of social capital, 
psychological factors, and control variables to explain adoption of pressurized irrigation. This 
analysis can further benefit by considering time and risk preferences of the farmers, so the 
explanatory power of the model can be increase. Further research could consider how risk 
preferences interact with psychological factors and if the interaction with trust, network, and 








With regards to model specification, the model provided robust results, but additional 
interaction of variables could not be performed, as the analysis of covariance required a higher 
sample size. We believe that for further research, the results can be defined as a baseline to 
follow-up adoption rates and identify whether government interventions had any impact on 
beliefs, intentions and adoption expanding the database for analysis. 
 
In Chapter 3, there were no significant differences between treatments having both a positive 
influence on conservation behavior.  We identify that in the collective treatment, the pre-
established threshold could have been set higher. In addition, as PES requires certain level 
of organizational structure, further experiments could include the interaction with current social 
capital (trust) and assess whether the introduction of incentives fosters collective action. In the 
same line, further research could be beneficial on understanding higher payment levels, and 
the interaction with already establish collective action mechanism.  Future work should 
measure expectations on others behavior and try to capture expected probability of receiving 
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Appendix  1. The SEM input (Mplus 7) - Integral 
model (TPB, social capital and control variables) 
Title:  Integral model (TPB, social capital and control variables), Lanza, Engler  & Wollni 
2017 
Latent variables 
Attitude (f1)    f1 by A1 A2 A3 A5 A6; 
Intention (f2)    f2 by I1 I2 I3 I4 I5; 
Perceived control (f3)   f3 by CP3 CP4 CP6 CP5; 
Institutional trust (f4)   f4 by CI1 CI2 CI3;      
 
Regression relationships (on statements) 
Attitudes    f1 on tecni f4 f5 C1 network ns3 n1; 
Intention    f2 on f1 f3 norma ns3 ; 
Perceived control   f3 on extens tecni network edu; 
Subjective norms   norma on n1 f4 f5 rmcoma ns3 network ;  
Water payment   logagua on limrieg; 
Role in local organizations  rmcoma on edu; 
 
Dependent variable 
Covariates of adoption behavior  dumadop on f2  area  extens  edad  exp edu  
limrieg tecni logagua; 
Correlation specification (with statement) 
Perceived control and attitudes   f3 with f1; 
Perceived control with subjective norm  f3 with norma; 
Subjective norm with attitudes   norma with f1; 









Appendix 2. Items for Latent variables creation 
The results of the robust unweighted least squares (ULSMV) show that Attitudes, perceived 
control and intentions are latent variables in the model constructed from a set of statements. 
Table 9 shows the standardized regression coefficients for the individual statements reflecting 
their relationship with the continuous latent variables. Statements measuring attitude are 
significant at the 1% level, with “modern irrigation technology contributes to soil conservation” 
(β=.893, SE=.034) being the strongest, followed by “modern irrigation technology improves 
crop management” (β=.862, SE=.033). Subjective norms are related mostly to water 
community organizations and their approval of the technology and the expectation of other 
farmers approving the adoption of the technology. With regards to perceived control, all 
statements are significant at 1% level, with “I have the knowledge to correctly operate a 
modern irrigation technology” (β=.960, SE=.015) having the strongest influence, followed by 
“I am able to program an irrigation system” (β=.952, SE=.017), and “I can effectively implement 
a modern irrigation system” (β=.916, SE=.024). These results show how important it is that 
the farmer feels secure about having the knowledge to operate the system. Normally, this 
information comes through extension services that can be considered bridging networks, 
and/or fellow farmers that have already implemented the technology (i.e., bonding networks), 
highlighting the importance of social capital and its influence on intention. 
 
Table 9. Standardized regression coefficients of the relationships for the statements of the continuous latent 
variables10 
  Estimate S.E Est/S.E P-Value 
Attitude     
Modern irrigation technology contributes to soil conservation .893 .034 26.358 .000 
Modern irrigation technology improves crop management .862 .033 26.098 .000 
Investing in modern irrigation technology is profitable .805 .035 23.181 .000 
Modern irrigation technology is the solution to facing water 
limitations .779 .037 21.155 .000 
Modern irrigation technology increases yields 0.764 .038 19.968 .000 
 
 
10 The coefficients provided by Mplus for the predictors to observed categorical dependent variable are the 







  Estimate S.E Est/S.E P-Value 
     
Perceived control  
   
I have the knowledge to correctly operate a modern irrigation 
technology .960 .015 62.398 .000 
I am able to program an irrigation system .952 .017 54.820 .000 
I can effectively implement a modern irrigation system .916 .024 38.157 .000 
I consider myself capable of operating a modern irrigation 
technology .904 .020 45.202 .000 
Intention   
   
I have the intention to be trained in irrigation systems this 
year .859 .043 20.073 .000 
I am planning to incorporate instruments for the determination 
of water requirements .763 .040 19.285 .000 
I have the intention to hire a consultant to improve planning 
and maintenance of irrigation systems .713 .041 17.423 .000 
I would be willing to borrow money to adopt modern irrigation 
systems on the farm .695 .046 14.967 .000 
Within the next 12 months I have the intention to adopt 







Appendix 3. Survey – Adoption of irrigation 
technologies by small farmers in the Maule and 





ENCUESTA PROYECTO FONDECYT Nº 1140615 
 
“ADOPCIÓN DE TECNOLOGÍAS DE RIEGO ENTRE PEQUEÑOS Y MEDIANOS AGRICULTORES 
DE LA REGIÓN DEL MAULE Y O’HIGGINS:  
EL ROL DEL CAPITAL SOCIAL” 
 
Toda información proporcionada tendrá carácter confidencial, donde el manejo de datos solo será 
de tipo estadístico y NO se facilitará a terceros. La información personal solicitada tiene por único fin 
el poder fiscalizar el correcto proceso de toma de encuestas. 
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Tiempo de viaje 

































N° de hijos del 
contacto  
14. 



















BASICA MEDIA SUPERIOR POSTGRADO 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8 9   10   11   12 
13   14   15   16   
17 
18   19   20   21   22   
23 
 
TECNOLOGÍAS DE RIEGO EN VIÑAS 
 
18. ¿Recibe recomendaciones de riego de parte de algún asesor? 
 
 Sí   No 
 
“Si la respuesta es NO sáltese a la pregunta 24” 
 
19. ¿A qué entidad pertenece el asesor que realiza dichas recomendaciones de riego? 
      (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 Privado   Asociación 
agrícola 
  Indap–  
Prodesal      
  Proveedor de 
insumos 
 
 GTT   Bodega- 
Comprador 
  Otro 
_______________ 
  Otro 
________________ 
 
20. ¿Qué tipo de asesor realiza las recomendaciones de riego? 
 
 Asesor general de 
cultivos 
  Asesor especialista en 
riego 
 
21. ¿Cómo califica la calidad de la asesoría que recibe? 
 
a) Responsabilidad  b) Conocimientos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
22. ¿Cuántas visitas realiza el asesor en el año?    
 N°___________________ 
 
23. ¿Cuál es el costo por visita del asesor?     







“Sáltese a la pregunta 28” 
 
24. ¿Quién decide cuánto y cuándo regar? 
 
 Propietario   Administrador- 
Gerente 
agrícola 
  Asesor    Trabajador 
 
25. ¿Dicha persona ha recibido capacitación formal en riego? 
 
 Sí   No 
	
“Si la respuesta es NO sáltese a la pregunta 28” 
	




                     Universidad- 
Centro de 
investigación 




27. ¿Cuántas capacitaciones formales ha tenido en los últimos 3 años?      
N°___________________ 
  
28. ¿En base a qué fuente de información riega sus cultivos? 




  Instrumentos 
de otros 
  Medios masivos 
(diario, web, TV) 
  Criterio personal 
 
“Si responde INSTRUMENTOS pase a la pregunta 29, de lo contrario sáltese a la 30” 
 
29. ¿Qué clase de instrumentos se utilizan para definir cuánto y cuándo regar? 




  Sensores 
de suelo  
  Estaciones 
meteorológicas 
  Bandeja de  
evaporación 
  Otros 
menores 
 









  Sí, 
ocasionalmente 
  No, 
Nunca 
  No aplica, 
No 
pertenece  
                                







 No   Sí _______________________________________________ 
 
33. ¿ A través de qué medios de comunicación obtiene información meteorológica? 
       (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 Internet    Televisión    Radio   Diario   Amigos 
 
34. ¿A través de qué medios obtiene información sobre seminarios, charlas, capacitación o nuevas 
tecnologías y técnicas de producción agrícola? 
      (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 Asesores   Colegas / 
Amigos 
  Proveedores 
de insumos 






  Ninguna   Otro 
______________ 
  Otro 
_______________ 
 
35. ¿Tiene limitaciones de agua para regar?  
 
 Sí   No 
  
“Si la respuesta es NO sáltese a la pregunta 38” 
 
36. ¿Cuán frecuentes han sido estas limitaciones de riego en los últimos 3 años? 
 
 Muy frecuentes   Frecuentes   Poco 
frecuentes 
  Muy poco 
frecuentes 
 
37. ¿A qué motivos atribuye estas limitaciones? 




  Gestión de la 
comunidad 
agua 
  Falta de 
obras de 
riego 




38. ¿Ha participado en algún proyecto de transferencia tecnológica en riego? 
 
 Sí   No 
 
“Si la respuesta es NO sáltese a la pregunta 43” 
 
39. ¿Qué tipo de participación tuvo en el proyecto? 
       (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 Ensayos en el 
predio 
  Asesoría 
directa 
  Cursos 
formales 
(medio año o 
más) 








40. ¿Qué entidad organizó el proyecto?     _____________________ 
 
41. ¿Cuánto tiempo ha participado o participó en dicho proyecto (años)?
 _____________________  
 
42. ¿Qué nota le pondría al apoyo recibido (de 1 a 7)?   ______________
 _______    
43. Indique el “tiempo de riego por hectárea si tiene riego tecnificado” ó el “número de riegos por 
hectárea si tiene riego gravitacional” en cada mes de la temporada. Si practica ambos sistemas 






























        
 
44. Si se arrienda agua en su sector, ¿Cuál es el valor de un día de agua ó del metro cúbico? 
 
 
$____________________/día   $____________________/m3 
 
45. ¿Cuenta con riego tecnificado en su predio? 
 
 Sí   No 
 
“Si la respuesta es SI sáltese a la pregunta 47” 
 
46. ¿Por qué motivos no cuenta con riego tecnificado? 
       (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 No conozco 
la tecnología  
  Tengo agua 
en 
abundancia 
  La inversión 
es muy alta 
  No aumenta 
los ingresos 
 
“Esta sección de la encuesta terminó” 
 
47. ¿Quién realizó la instalación de su sistema de riego tecnificado? 
 
 Empresa - personal externo   Propietario - personal 
interno 
 







48. ¿Cómo califica la calidad de la empresa o personal que realizó la instalación del sistema de 
riego? 
	
a) Responsabilidad  b) Conocimientos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
49. ¿Ha recibido subsidios de inversión al riego? 
 
 Sí   No 
 
“Si la respuesta es NO sáltese a la pregunta 51” 
 
50. ¿Qué porcentaje de bonificación recibió? 
Si cuenta con más de un sistema, indique el promedio   ____________________% 
 
51. ¿Qué clase de mantenciones realiza al sistema de riego anualmente? 
       (puede marcar más de una) 
 
 Ninguna, no se 
realizan  
  Limpieza de 
boquillas- 
goteros 
  Limpieza 
de filtros 
  Chequear 
uniformidad de 
descarga de agua 
 
“Si la respuesta es NINGUNA esta sección de la encuesta terminó” 
 
52. ¿Quién realiza las mantenciones al sistema de riego?  
 
 Empresa - personal externo   Propietario - personal 
interno 
 
“Si la respuesta es PROPIETARIO - PERSONAL INTERNO esta sección de la encuesta terminó” 
  
53. ¿Cómo califica la calidad del servicio que recibe? 
	
a) Responsabilidad  b) Conocimientos 







RENTABILIDAD DEL VIÑEDO 
54. Complete el siguiente cuadro para las 4 cepas más relevantes en su predio, listadas en orden de superficie. 
       Información debe ser de temporada anterior. Indique  la fila con mayor superficie al final de esta página. 
Cep
a Nombre 
Tipo de Conducción 
























  Espaldera Reserva          
 Espaldera Varietal 
         
 Parrón Reserva 
         
 Parrón Varietal 
         
2 
 
 Espaldera Reserva 
         
 Espaldera Varietal 
         
 Parrón Reserva 
         
 Parrón Varietal 
         
3 
 
 Espaldera Reserva 
         
 Espaldera Varietal 
         
 Parrón Reserva 
         
 Parrón Varietal 
         
4 
 
 Espaldera Reserva 
         
 Espaldera Varietal 
         
 Parrón Reserva 
         
 Parrón Varietal 
         
* Sistema de manejo:  1) Convencional   2) Orgánico   3) Biodinámico   4) Otro 
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(JH - JM) 
A) Poda y 
amarre 
      
B) Cosecha       
C) Desbrote       
D) Chapoda       
E) Control 
malezas 
      









Respond in scale from 1 to 5 according to their level of agreement with the following statements. 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Confianza 1 2 3 4 5 
57. 	 I can trust the people around me without the need to be cautious 
     
58. 	 Farmers are reliable people  
 
 
    
59. 	 I believe that other farmers would not harm me for their own benefit 
     
60. 	 The people of the neighborhood works together to solve problems of water availability  
     
61. 	 In the last five years it has increased confidence among producers who belong to the Water Community  N/A 
     
62. 	 I could lean on friends if I require not too large amounts of money 
     
63. 	 Agricultural associations work for the welfare of farmers and the agricultural sector 
     
 
 Indique su grado de confianza en: 1 2 3 4 5 
64. 	 Municipalities   
    
65. 	 Public Institutions    
    
66. 	 Th estate of Chile   
    
67. 	 Water Communities N/A   
    
68. 	 Channel Association N/A   
    
69. 	 Supervisory Council N/A   
    
 
 Normas 1 2 3 4 5 
70. 	 Always I obey the laws and regulations (labor, transit, tax, etc.)  
     
71. 	 When the people around me have a hard time whenever I help them 
     
72. 	 I always vote in presidential and municipal elections   
    
73. 	 I disapprove when farmers receive benefits that do not qualify      
74. 	 My workers have better working conditions than other farms      




 Redes formales 1 2 3 4 5 
76. 	 I go to all the meetings of the associations to which I belong (except for emergencies) N/A   
        
77. 	 My opinion is considered in agricultural associations to which I belong N/A   
    






79. 	 When attending agricultural events, my participation is usually more active than others 
     
80. 	 I know and I am linked regularly with professionals and experts of agriculture 
 
 
    
81. 	 Organizations interact to improve the service and information they provide to farmers 
     
82. 	 I have participated in non-agricultural voluntary organizations (religious, cultural, political, community, etc.) 
     
 
 Redes informales 1 2 3 4 5 
83. 	 In the work field, I often communicate with neighboring farmers    
      
84. 	 I spend time with my friends because I consider important to share with them 
     
85. 	 I always support my farming neighbors when they have a problem 
        
86. 	 I maintain frequent contact with representatives of the water community  N/A 
     
87. 	 I organize meetings with producers and / or consultants to acquire new knowledge in agriculture 




COMPORTAMIENTO PLANIFICADO  
 
Respond in scale from 1 to 5 according to their level of agreement with the following statements. 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree 
 
 
 Normas sociales y personales 1 2 3 4 5 
94. 	 The water community which I belong expect or expected me to adopt modern irrigation systems N/A 
     
95. 	 Other farmers see or saw good I adopt modern irrigation   
    
96. 	 I adopted or I would adopt irrigation technology because it helps to conserve water resources 
     
97. 	 The nearby community perceives me as a farmer who cares about the environment 
     
98. 	 I share information with other farmers about management techniques to improve agricultural production 
     
 
 Control percibido 1 2 3 4 5 
99. 	 I have enought funds to invest in irrigation technology (consider subsidies) 
     
 
 Actitudes 1 2 3 4 5 
88. 	 The irrigation technology improves crop management           
89. 	 Investing in irrigation technology is profitable           
90. 	 The irrigation technology increase yields            
91. 	 Investment in irrigation technology is relatively low for farmers          
92. 	 The irrigation technology is the solution to address problems of water shortage 
         
93. 	 The irrigation systems promotes soil conservation   






100. 	I count with people or companies in which I could lean to implement modern irrigation 
     
101. 	I have knowledge to successfully operate a modern irrigation system 
     
102. 	I am able to program an irrigation system    
    
103. 	I can effectively implement a modern irrigation system   
    
104. 	I consider that the operation of a technology irrigation system is  easy 
 
 
    
 
 Intención conductual 1 2 3 4 5 
105. 	Within this or next year I have planned to adopt modern irrigation systems 
     
106. 	I'm planning to incorporate instruments for the determination of water requirements 
     
107. 	I would be willing to borrow money to adopt modern irrigation systems on the farm 
     
108. 	I have the intention to be trained in irrigation systems this year      
109. 	I have the intention to hire a consultant to improve planning and maintenance of irrigation system 
     
110. 	I have the intention to offer to be part of the leadership of the water community  N/A 








Número con los 
que se relaciona 
Cercanía de relación promediada 
(Alta/  Media / Baja)  
Proveedores de insumos   
Compradores de uva   
Entidades financieras   
Empresas certificadoras   
Colegas    
































n (B-R-M)  
Comunidad de aguas 
 
 
     
Asociación de Canalistas 
 
 
     
 
Junta de Vigilancia 
 
 
     
A. Agrícola 1 
_____________________________
_ 
     
A. Agrícola 2 
_____________________________
_ 
     
A. Agrícola 3 
_____________________________
_ 
     
A. No-agrícola 1 
_____________________________
_ 
     
A. No-agrícola 2 
_____________________________
_ 
     
A. No-agrícola 3 
_____________________________
_ 
     
 
 











Appendix  4. Instructions Investment Game 
The workshop comprises:  
1. Sign-in (location and arrival)  
2. Introduction and agenda (an introduction of the experimenter, enumerators and the 
project)  
3. Warm-up Quiz  
4. Instructions and examples  
5. Hypothetical and non-hypothetical decisions  
6. Post-experimental survey  
7. Payment (voucher) 
1. Sign-in (location and arrival)  
- Each participant is signed in by stating his/her name and showing the invitation letter. An 
enumerator accompanies the participant to a randomly assigned seat, which is the 
participant’s location throughout the session.  
- The experiment is conducted in session of 9 participants in classrooms in local  schools 
or kindergartens.  
- The typical layout of the room is as follows:  
Front of the room (experimenter, and white board) 
Seat 1 Seat 4 Seat 7 
Seat 2 Seat 5 Seat 8 
Seat 3 Seat 6 Seat 9 
Back of the room (Enumerators) 
 Notes:  
- Text in italics is not part of the instructions.  
- The instructions are explained orally by the experimenter in the local language (Bahasa 
Indonesia).  
2. Introduction and agenda  
Good afternoon and welcome to this workshop. Before we start we would like to thank you for 
your assistance. The experimenter introduces himself, the enumerators and the project, 
typically as follows: This workshop is organized by the EFFORTS project that  aims to 
understand the decisions that farmers make associated to the four transformation systems: 






University of Göttingen, Germany, University of Jambi and IPB University of Bogor. The results 
will used for academic purpose only. We have been holding workshops with farmers in three 
other villages, e.g. , in Batanghari district.  
In this workshop you can earn some money, which will be given to you as a voucher for the 
shop in your village. Your earnings in this workshop depend on your decisions and the 
decisions of your group members. In other words, you can influence the amount of money the 
group members earn and your earnings will be influenced by your group members. Today’s 
workshop includes the following steps. First, we explain the instructions of the different tasks 
on decision making. Then you will do two hypothetical runs by yourself, before we will start 
with the actual decision rounds. At the end of the workshop you receive the earnings you have 
generated in this workshop, as a food voucher, which can be made payable in the local shop 
in your village. The workshops will take approximately two hours. 
Some general comments:  
- Please don’t use your mobile phone throughout the workshop.  
- The workshop in which you participate now is most likely different from the ones your 
neighbors in this village have already participated. Hence comments you might have heard 
in the last days, do not apply necessarily for your session.  
- All decisions you make or answers you give during the workshop will remain private, 
confidential and anonymous. Only the number tags that you will receive in a moment will 
help us to distinguish your answers. So neither the other session members no the 
experimenter team are able to assign you as a person to a specific decision or earning.  
- Since all your decisions are private, don’t talk to each other anymore. Please do not 
discuss with your neighbor. 
- Please follow these instructions carefully, so that everybody can make sure that you 
understood the explanation. If you have any questions, please raise your hands. A 
member of the research team will come to you and answer your questions.  
Do you have any questions so far? 
 
3. Warm-up Quiz  
We will start today’s workshop with a short warm-up exercise. The experimenter hands  out 
the questionnaires to the participants. Three enumerators assist the participants in filling out 
the questionnaire. The exercise contains four different questions. It is not at  test; so you don’t 
need to worry if they seem difficult. Please fill out the questions by  yourself and do not discuss 






asked with regard to subtraction and addition of numbers. This basically enables the 
participants to start thinking about the material and decisions they will be presented with during 
the workshop. After all participants have finished the sheets were collected by enumerators.  
 
4. Instructions  
Posters are displayed on a large white board in front of the room to explain the basics of the 
experiment. In addition, the experimental material, such as envelopes, decision cards and 
stickers are used by the experimenter to explain the decision making progress.  
 
4.1 What you need to do during the workshop?  
In this workshop you will play in groups of 3 people. It means that two other people in  this 
session will be in your group. You don’t know and will never know who is in your group. The 
groups remain the same throughout the whole workshop.  
 
In this session you can own either 5 or 10 ha of land. Each of you will choose one of these 
brown closed envelopes at the beginning of the session. In the envelope you find these green 
stickers. One sticker represents one ha. So you will find in your chosen envelope either 5 or 
10 stickers in a row, indicating 5 or 10 ha. Whether you receive 5 or 10 ha depend on the 
envelope you choose at the beginning of the session. It indicates it is completely random how 
many ha you receive and cannot be influenced by you or others in the group. Experimenter 
shows both the brown envelope, one sticker and the row of 5 and 10 stickers respectively.  
 
Then you have to decide what you want to plant on your land. You can choose between two 
production systems: Oil palm and Jungle rubber. You can decide how many ha you plant with 
oil palm and how many ha you plant with jungle rubber. Experimenter shows a picture of oil 
palm monoculture plantation and jungle rubber system, respectively. Even though, I guess 
you are familiar with these two production systems, I would like to briefly introduce them to 
you. Here you can see a picture of an oil palm plantation, where the oil palms are planted in 
rows and fertilizer and herbicides are applied. This is a picture of a jungle rubber plot. In jungle 
rubber, you can find besides rubber trees also other trees like Rambutan, Durian, Meranti and 
fertilizer and herbicides are seldom used. Compared to oil palm, jungle rubber is good for the 
environment: soil is healthier, more water is available and the number of birds and mammals 
is higher. As in real life the earnings in this session depend on what you plant on your ha. The 








So far any questions? To wrap up, you receive either 5 or 10 ha and you have to decide how 
many you plant with oil palm plantation and jungle rubber, respectively. While jungle rubber is 
better for the environment, oil palm generated higher earnings. 
 
4.2 How much can you earn in this game?  
The experimenter displays a large earning table on the white board.  
Here you can see an earning table. The earning table of one decision round remains here until 
you have made your decision that you can look up the earnings again during your decision 
making process. We will go slowly through it. As I already mentioned, the amount on the 
voucher that you can earn in this workshop, depends on the decision on how many hectares 
you cultivate oil palm and jungle rubber respectively.  
 
The earnings that you receive per ha oil palm and jungle rubber depend on the amount of land 
that you own. Participants with 5 ha look their earnings up here; participants with 10 ha look 
their earnings up here. Experimenter points at the respective columns. Suppose that you own 
5 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR; one ha with jungle rubber gives 
you 50,000 IDR.  
 
Experimenter points at respective cells. 
 
Which production system gives the higher earnings per ha? The earnings from one ha planted 
with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 
Suppose that you own 10 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha 
planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Which production system generates the 
higher earning per ha? Like for the 5ha farmers, the earnings from one ha planted with oil 
palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. Now, 
let us compare the earnings for farmers with 5 ha with the earnings of farmers with 10 ha: For 
oil palm, both farmers with 5 and 10 ha receive 100,000 IDR. Are the earnings per ha oil palm 
the same for 5 and 10 ha farmers? Yes! Are they also the same for jungle rubber? Let’s take 
a look. Farmers with 5 ha receive 50,000 IDR from one ha planted with jungle rubber. Farmers 
with 10 ha receive 60,000 IDR from one ha planted with jungle rubber. So farmers with 5 ha 
receive less from one ha planted with jungle rubber than farmers with 10 ha. Experimenter 







As I have already mentioned, your earnings do not only depend on your decision on how many 
ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber respectively, it also depends on the decision of 
your group members (the other two participants in your group). These earnings are depicted 
in this column. Experimenter point at respective column. One ha that you plant with jungle 
rubber, gives your two group members 20,000 IDR. And the other way around, one ha planted 
by your group members gives you 20,000 IDR. Let’s make an example: Suppose we 
(Experimenter randomly selects two others) are in one group. Of course, in the experiment 
you won’t know the other two group members. Let’s assume I plant one ha of jungle rubber, 
he/she receives 20,000 IDR each. It indicates that I can influence the earnings of my two group 
members. And the other way around, let’s assume, he /she plants one ha jungle rubber I 
receive 20,000 IDR. It means that my earnings are affected by the decision of my group 
members.  
 
If you have any questions, please ask. We will play together a number of decisions. In each 
decision we will change the earnings. In each decision, you decide how many ha you want to 
plant with oil palm and how many ha you want to plant with jungle rubber. Due to the fact that 
the numbers change from decision to decision, please make your decision very carefully.  
 
4.3 How to make decisions?  
As I mentioned before, in this brown envelope you can find stickers, the number of ha that you 
own in this workshop. For each decision you will receive a new envelope with the same 
amount of stickers as in the previous decision. In addition you will find this decision card, with 
a picture of an oil palm plantation and jungle rubber plot. Experimenter show small decision 
card. A large decision card is displayed on the white board. On this decision card you make 
your decisions on how many ha you want to plant with oil palm and how many ha you want to 
plant with jungle rubber.  
 
Let’s make an example (1). The example is done on the white board with green dots, 
representing the stickers. Suppose that you receive a brown envelope with 5 ha, (represented 
by 5 stickers) Experimenter holds up the green dots and you decide to plant 3 ha with oil palm. 
You stick 3 stickers here, where you can see the picture of an oil palm plantation. Experimenter 
sticks the green dots on the white board. Now, you have planted 3 ha with oil palm plantation. 
In this example you intend to plant 2 ha with jungle rubber. Therefore you stick the stickers 
here, where you can see the picture of a jungle rubber plot. Experimenter sticks the green 






you have planted 3 ha oil palm plantation and 2 ha jungle rubber plot. All ha (stickers) have to 
be used in one decision round.  
 
Experimenter shows two alternative combinations of oil palm and jungle rubber by switching 
the green dots on the white board (1 oil palm/4 jungle rubber, 4 oil palm/1 jungle rubber).  
 
All possible combination should be considered in your decision process (Also 5/0; 0/5). Let’s 
make a second example (2): Again, the experimenter does the example on a white board 
(decision card for 10 ha farmers). Suppose that you receive a brown envelope with 10 ha, 
indicating that you own 10 ha in each decision round. Assuming that you decide to plant 4 ha 
with oil palm plantation, you stick 4 stickers here where you can see the picture of oil palm 
plantation. Experimenter sticks the stickers on the white board. Now you have planted 4 ha 
with oil palm plantation. On the remaining 6 ha you decide to cultivate jungle rubber. You stick 
6 stickers, where you can see the picture of a jungle rubber plot. 
 
 Experimenter sticks the stickers on the white board. Experimenter shows two alternative 
combinations of oil palm and jungle rubber by switching the green dots on the white board 
(8/2; 2/8).  
 
All possible combination should be considered in your decision process (Also 10/0; 0/10).  
 
4.4 What would have you earned in these two examples? 
 
Example 1:  
Experimenter has both the earning table and the decision cards from the previous examples 
on the white board.  
 
The calculation is written on a large blank paper on the white board. In the first example, you 
had 5 ha of land. You planted 3 ha with oil palm and 2 ha with jungle rubber. 
 
 Experimenter shows on white board.  
 
Where do you have to look up the earnings for 5 ha farmers? This row. 
 






One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. Experimenter shows respective cell. 
Since you decided in this example to plant 3 ha with oil palm, the earnings from oil palm are 
3*100,000IDR =300,000 IDR.  
 
In addition, we assumed that you decided to plant 2 ha with jungle rubber. One ha gives you 
50,000 IDR. You earned from jungle rubber 2*50,000 IDR =100,000 IDR. The calculation is 
written on white board. Are we already done with the whole calculation of your earning? No, 
the earnings generated due to the cultivation of jungle rubber by the group members have to 
be calculated. In addition, each ha that your two group members plant with jungle rubber, 
gives you 20,000 IDR.  
 
Experimenter shows on white board.  
 
Let’s suppose that your group members planted together 6 ha of jungle rubber. You earned 
6*20,000 IDR=120,00 IDR. In this example you earned in total 520,000 IDR. Amounts are 
summed up by experimenter. At the end of the session one decision is randomly drawn, 10% 
of the earnings are given to you in a closed envelope. Since the envelopes are closed, none 
of the other workshop members receive information on how much the others have earned in 
this workshop. 10% of 520,000 IDR are 52,000 IDR.  
 
Experimenter writes down the calculation on white board. Experimenter shows a voucher, 
containing the information on the amount of earnings (52,000 IDR).  
 
Example 2: 
 In this example you own 10 ha. You decided to plant 4 ha with oil palm and 6 ha with jungle 
rubber.  
 
Experimenter shows on white board.  
 
Since you owned 10 ha, we have to look the earnings up here.  
 
Experimenter points at respective cell.  
 
What have you earned in this decision round? How much do you earn from one ha cultivated 







Calculation is written on white board by experimenter.  
 
One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. In this example, you plant 4 ha with oil 
palm plantation. The earnings from oil palm are 4*100,000 IDR=400,000 IDR. You planted 6 
ha with jungle rubber. How much do you earn from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber? One 
ha planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. You earned from jungle rubber 6*60,000 
IDR=360,000 IDR. Are we already done with the calculation of the earnings? No!  
 
In addition, each ha that your group members plant with jungle rubber gives you 20,000 IDR. 
Let’s suppose that your other two group members planted in total 6 ha with  jungle rubber. 
You earned 6*20,000 IDR=120,000 IDR. In this example, you earned in total 880,000 
IDR*10%=88,000 IDR. You do not need to worry that you have to calculate your earnings by 
yourself. The earnings will be calculated by the team of enumerators. Nevertheless, for your 
decision making process it is quite important that you listen carefully to the explanations of the 
earning tables.  
 
Do you have any questions so far? Then, it is time that you make your decision by yourself. 
Before we start with the actual decisions, we play two decisions. The earnings of those two 
decisions won’t be paid out to you. It more that you get used to the whole procedure. The 
earnings we state here are for the next two decisions only hypothetical, afterwards we will play 
the actual decisions, where you can earn money. The enumerators assist you.  
 
5. Hypothetical decisions  
 
Communication of any kind is not allowed. Please make your private decisions now, each of 
you choose one of these brown envelopes and keep it closed in front of you. Participant 
choose brown envelope. Please open your envelope. Please fix this ID card on your cloth. 
Experimenter shows how to fix ID card. Enumerators assist participants. In the envelope you 
can find either 5 or 10 stickers, indicating the number of ha you own in each decision and the 
decision card. Before you make your decision, I will explain the earning table to you.  
Decision 1 (base scenario, no PES):  
 







Suppose that you own 5 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR, one ha with 
jungle rubber gives you 50,000 IDR. Experimenter points at respective cells. Suppose that 
you own 10 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha planted with 
jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Which production system generates higher earnings per 
ha? The earnings from one ha planted with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated 
from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. Now, let us compare the earnings for farmers with 
5 ha with the earnings of farmers with 10 ha: For oil palm, both farmers with 5 and 10 ha 
receive 100,000 IDR. Are the earnings per ha jungle rubber the same for 5 and 10 ha farmers? 
No! Farmers with 5 ha receive 50,000 IDR from one ha planted with jungle rubber. Farmers 
with 10 ha receive 60,000 IDR from one ha planted with jungle rubber. Hence, farmers with 5 
ha receive less from one ha planted with jungle rubber than farmers with 10 ha.  
Experimenter points at respective cells.  
 
Are we already done with the explanation of the earning table? No! One ha that you plant with 
jungle rubber gives your two group members 20,000 IDR. And the other way around, one ha 
planted by your group members gives you 20,000 IDR. Remember, now we play only 
hypothetically, so this money is not paid out to you. Please make you decision on how many 
ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber, respectively by sticking our stickers on the 
respective areas of the decision card. The enumerators assist you. When you have done your 
decisions and no stickers are left, please put your decision card back into the brown envelope.  
 
Now we play a second decision round. You will receive a white envelope, where you can find 
the same amount of stickers, as in the previous decision round and again the decision card. 
Since some numbers in the earning table will change, we will go again through the earning 
table. Please listen carefully. After the explanation, you are allowed to make your decision. 
Enumerators distribute white envelopes.  
 
Decisions 2 with monetary incentive for jungle rubber  
From here on, the explanations differ according to the treatments.  
Treatments:  
1. Individual PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments for 
Environmental Services. 
2. Collective PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments for 







The following section presents the instruction per treatment. 
 
Treatment 1. Individual PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments 
for Environmental Services. 
  
What is different in this decision round? We would like to introduce Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES)-like a bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber (you do not 
receive this bonus for the cultivation of oil palm). As we mentioned before, jungle rubber 
cultivation compared to oil palm has a positive impact on the environment: soil is healthier, 
more water is available and the number of birds and mammals increases. Therefore, we would 
like to foster pro-environmental behavior by paying extra amount of earning for the cultivation 
of jungle rubber.  
 
Experimenter changes the earning table by sticking an additional row for the Payments for 
environmental services on the white board.  
 
Let’s go through the earning table together: Suppose that you own 5 ha. One ha planted with 
oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR, one ha with jungle rubber gives you 50,000 IDR.  Here, you 
can see the bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, 
we give you a PES of 20,000 IDR, since jungle rubber cultivation is positive for the 
environment. In total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle rubber 70,000 IDR.  
 
Experimenter points at respective cells.  
 
Which production system generates higher earning per ha? The earnings from one ha planted 
with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 
Suppose that you own 10 ha. One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha 
planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Here you can see the bonus for the 
cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, we give you a PES of 
20,000 IDR, since jungle rubber cultivation is positive for the environment. In total, you earn 
per ha cultivated with jungle rubber 80,000 IDR. Which production system generates higher 
earnings per ha? The earnings from one ha planted with oil palm are higher than the earnings 







Let’s compare the bonus of 5 and 10 ha farmers. Both 5 and 10 ha farmers receive the same 
amount of bonus per ha jungle rubber. It indicates that, even with bonus, 10 ha farmers earn 
more (80,000 IDR) per ha than 5 ha farmers. They earn only 70,000 IDR per ha jungle rubber. 
In addition, one ha that you plant with jungle rubber gives your two group members 20,000 
IDR. And the other way around, one ha planted by your  group members gives you 20,000 
IDR. Remember this only a hypothetical decisions, so the money you earn in this round in not 
paid out to you.  
 
Please make you decision on how many ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber, 
respectively by sticking our stickers on the respective areas of the decision card. The 
enumerators assist you. When you have done your decisions and no stickers are left, please 
put your decision card back into the white envelope. 
 
We have played decisions. As you have recognized, we change the earnings between the 
decision rounds. Therefore it is quite essential that you make your decision very carefully. All 
combinations of oil palm /jungle rubber are possible and reasonable.  Now, we going to make 
the actual decisions. Now, it is not hypothetically any more. Your decisions in the upcoming 
decisions determine the amount that you gain in this workshop. 
 
Treatment 2. Collective PES scheme (where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments 
for Environmental Services and it is conditional to certain threshold) 
 
What is different in this decision round? We would like to introduce Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES)-like a bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber (you do not 
receive this bonus for the cultivation of oil palm). As we mentioned before, jungle rubber 
cultivation compared to oil palm has a positive impact on the environment: soil is healthier, 
more water is available and the number of birds and mammals increases. Therefore, we would 
like to foster pro-environmental behavior by paying extra amount of earning for the cultivation 
of jungle rubber but this extra amount is subject to a minimum number of hectares of jungle 
rubber that you and your two group members cultivate with jungle rubber. The minimum 
number of hectares with jungle rubber that the group have to achieve is 7 has. Remember, 
communication of any kind is not allowed. Before you make your decision, I will explain the 







Experimenter changes the earning table by sticking an additional row for the Payments for 
environmental services on the white board.  
 
Let’s go through the earning table together: Suppose that you own 5 ha. One ha planted with 
oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR, one ha with jungle rubber gives you 50,000 IDR.  Here, you 
can see the bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, 
we give you a PES of 20,000 IDR if the total group cultivates 7 has, since jungle rubber 
cultivation is positive for the environment. If the group achieves the 7 has, then you earn per 
ha cultivated with jungle rubber is 70,000 IDR, otherwise you earning remains at 50,000 IDR. 
 
Experimenter points at respective cells.  
 
Which production system generates higher earning per ha? The earnings from one ha planted 
with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 
Suppose that you own 10 ha. One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha 
planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Here you can see the bonus for the 
cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, we give you a PES of 
20,000 IDR if you and your two group members achieve the 7 has of jungle rubber since its 
cultivation is positive for the environment. In total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle rubber 
80,000 IDR if the 7 has are achieved otherwise you earning remain at 60,000. Which 
production system generates higher earnings per ha? The earnings from one ha planted with 
oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber.  
 
Let’s compare the bonus of 5 and 10 ha farmers. Both 5 and 10 ha farmers receive the same 
amount of bonus per ha jungle rubber. It indicates that, even with bonus, 10 ha farmers earn 
more (80,000 IDR) per ha than 5 ha farmers. They earn only 70,000 IDR per ha jungle rubber. 
In addition, one ha that you plant with jungle rubber gives your two group members 20,000 
IDR. And the other way around, one ha planted by your group members gives you 20,000 
IDR. Remember this only a hypothetical decisions, so the money you earn in this round in not 
paid out to you.  
 
Please make you decision on how many ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber, 
respectively by sticking our stickers on the respective areas of the decision card. The 
enumerators assist you. When you have done your decisions and no stickers are left, please 







We have played decisions. As you have recognized, we change the earnings between the 
decision rounds. Therefore it is quite essential that you make your decision very carefully. All 
combinations of oil palm /jungle rubber are possible and reasonable.  Now, we going to make 
the actual decisions. Now, it is not hypothetically any more. Your decisions in the upcoming 
decisions determine the amount that you gain in this workshop. 
 
 
6. Non-hypothetical setting 
Communication of any kind is still not allowed. Please make your private decisions. Now, each 
of you choose one of these brown envelopes and keep it closed in front of you. Participant 
choose brown envelope. Please open your envelope. Please fix this ID card on your cloth. 
Experimenter shows how to fix ID card. Enumerators assist participants. In the envelope you 
can find either 5 or 10 stickers, indicating the number of ha you own in each decision and the 
decision card. Before you make your decision, I will go again through the earning table. It is 
very essential that you listen very carefully.  
 
Round 1 (base scenario, no PES) 
Experimenter uses the earning table displayed on white board to explain the earnings.  
Suppose that you own 5 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR, one ha with 
jungle rubber gives you 50,000 IDR. Experimenter points at respective cells. Suppose that 
you own 10 ha: One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha planted with 
jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Again, the earning for jungle rubber is lower than for oil 
palm. Are the earnings per ha jungle rubber the same for 5 and 10 ha farmers? No! Farmers 
with 5 ha receive less from one ha planted with jungle rubber than farmers with 10 ha.  
 
Experimenter points at respective cells. 
 
Please consider, furthermore that one ha that you plant with jungle rubber gives your two 
group members 20,000 IDR. And the other way around, one ha planted by your group 
members gives you 20,000 IDR. Please make you decision on how many ha you plant with 
oil palm and jungle rubber, respectively by sticking our stickers on the respective areas of the 
decision card. The enumerators assist you. When you have done your decisions and no 
stickers are left, please put your decision card back into the brown envelope. Now we play a 
second decision round. You will receive a white envelope, where you can find the same 






numbers in the earning table will change, we will go again through the earning table. Please 
listen carefully. After the explanation, you are allowed to make your decision.  
Enumerators distribute white envelopes. 
 
 Round  2 and 3 with monetary incentive for jungle rubber (the incentive could be low 
or high) 
From here on, the explanations differ according to the treatments.  
Treatments:  
- Individual PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments for 
Environmental Services. 
- Collective PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments for 
Environmental Services and it is conditional to certain threshold. 
Treatment 1. Individual PES scheme, where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments 
for Environmental Services. 
What is different in this decision round? We would like to introduce Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES)-like a bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber (you do not 
receive this bonus for the cultivation of oil palm). As we mentioned before, jungle rubber 
cultivation compared to oil palm has a positive impact on the environment: soil is healthier, 
more water is available and the number of birds and mammals increases. Therefore, we would 
like to foster pro-environmental behavior by paying extra amount of earning for the cultivation 
of jungle rubber. Experimenter changes the earning table by sticking an additional row for the 
Payments for environmental services on the white board.  
 
Let’s go through the earning table together: Suppose that you own 5 ha. One ha planted with 
oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR, one ha with jungle rubber gives you 50,000 IDR. Here, you 
can see the bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, 
we give you a PES of X IDR, since jungle rubber cultivation is positive for the environment. In 
total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle rubber X IDR. 
 
Experimenter points at respective cells.  
Which production system generates higher earning per ha? The earnings from one ha planted 
with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 






planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Here you can see the bonus for the 
cultivation of jungle rubber.  
For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, we give you a PES of X IDR, since jungle rubber 
cultivation is positive for the environment. In total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle rubber 
X IDR. Which production system generates higher earnings per ha? The earnings from one 
ha planted with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with 
jungle rubber. 
 
Let’s compare the bonus of 5 and 10 ha farmers. Both 5 and 10 ha farmers receive the same 
amount of bonus per ha jungle rubber. It indicates that, even with bonus, 10 ha farmers earn 
more per ha than 5 ha farmers. They earn only X IDR per ha jungle rubber. In addition, as 
always one ha that you plant with jungle rubber gives your two group members 20,000 IDR. 
And the other way around, one ha planted by your group members gives you 20,000 IDR.  
 
Please make you decision on how many ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber, 
respectively by sticking our stickers on the respective areas of the decision card. The 
enumerators assist you. When you have done your decisions and no stickers are left, please 
put your decision card back into the white envelope. 
Treatment 2. Collective PES scheme (where incentive is explicitly framed as Payments 
for Environmental Services and it is conditional to certain threshold) 
 
What is different in this decision round? We would like to introduce Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES)-like a bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber (you do not 
receive this bonus for the cultivation of oil palm) but at considering you and your two group 
members contribution. As we mentioned before, jungle rubber cultivation compared to oil palm 
has a positive impact on the environment: soil is healthier, more water is available and the 
number of birds and mammals increases. Therefore, we would like to foster pro-environmental 
behavior by paying extra amount of earning for the cultivation of jungle rubber but you and 
your two group members have to achieve a minimum of 7 has in order to receive this extra 
payment. Experimenter changes the earning table by sticking an additional row for the 
Payments for environmental services on the white board with the caveat of 7 has as minimum 
number of has on jungle rubber. 
 
Let’s go through the earning table together: Suppose that you own 5 ha. One ha planted with 






can see the bonus for the cultivation of jungle rubber. For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, 
we give you a PES of X IDR if you and your two group members achieve 7 has of jungle rubber 
as its cultivation is positive for the environment. In total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle 
rubber X IDR if 7 has are achieved, otherwise your earnings reaming of 50,000 IDR. 
 
Experimenter points at respective cells.  
Which production system generates higher earning per ha? The earnings from one ha planted 
with oil palm are higher than the earnings generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 
Suppose that you own 10 ha. One ha planted with oil palm gives you 100,000 IDR. One ha 
planted with jungle rubber gives you 60,000 IDR. Here you can see the bonus for the 
cultivation of jungle rubber.  
For each ha cultivated with jungle rubber, we give you a PES of X IDR, since jungle rubber 
cultivation is positive for the environment if the group achieves 7 has of jungle rubber as 
minimum. In total, you earn per ha cultivated with jungle rubber X IDR if the 7 has are achieved, 
otherwise your earning are of 60,000 IDR. Which production system generates higher 
earnings per ha? The earnings from one ha planted with oil palm are higher than the earnings 
generated from one ha cultivated with jungle rubber. 
 
Let’s compare the bonus of 5 and 10 ha farmers. Both 5 and 10 ha farmers receive the same 
amount of bonus per ha jungle rubber. It indicates that, even with bonus, 10 ha farmers earn 
more per ha than 5 ha farmers. They earn only X IDR per ha jungle rubber if the contribution 
at the group level is 7 or more. In addition, as always one ha that you plant with jungle rubber 
gives your two group members 20,000 IDR. And the other way around, one ha planted by your 
group members gives you 20,000 IDR.  
 
Please make you decision on how many ha you plant with oil palm and jungle rubber, 
respectively by sticking our stickers on the respective areas of the decision card. The 
enumerators assist you. When you have done your decisions and no stickers are left, please 




Thank you very much for your participation. Now we would like to continue with a short 
post experimental survey. The interviews will be done individually. Since we cannot 






by the enumerators. Please help yourself with the refreshers. Now you are also allowed 
to communicate, but we kindly ask you not to talk with your neighbors about the game 
until the workshop is over. In the meantime your earning that you gained in this 
workshop will be calculated. 






Appendix  5.  Post Experimental Survey - Indonesia 
Q1. ID :  _______________  
Q2. Workshop ID : __________________ 
Q3. Treatment :____________________ 
Q4. Date of workshop : __________/____________/20________ 




Q7. Interviewer’s signature:      
_______________________________________________________ 
 
We kindly ask you to answer some questions regarding the decisions you have recently 
made. Please tick the appropriate answer.  
Q8. In this workshop you earned some money. The amount of money that you earned in this 
workshop depends on: 
                      Only on your production decision in this workshop 
                      On your production decision and the production decision of your group members 
 
Neither on your production decision, nor on the production decision of your group 
members. It was not possible for you or your group members to influence the 
amount of money.  
Q 9. In the decisions, all participants had the same amount of available land.  
 Yes  No 
Q 10. The earnings from oil palm (per hectare) were higher than the earnings from rubber 
agroforestry (per hectare) 
 Yes  No 
Q 11. The earnings per hectare rubber agroforestry were different for participants with 5 
hectare and those with 10 ha.  
 Yes       No 
Q 12. The introduction of Payments for environmental services aimed to foster rubber 
agroforestry cultivation. 
 Yes       No 
Q 13.The amount of Payments for Environmental services per hectare rubber agroforestry 
was different for participants with 5 hectare and those with 10 hectare.  .  
 Yes       No  
Q 14. What do you think was the objective of this workshop? 
  
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Q 15. I feel satisfied with the earning I received 






Q 16. I had the feeling that I could influence the 
amount of earning that I receive in this 
workshop.  
    
Q 17. I had the feeling that the amount of 
earning was just a matter of luck.      
Q 18. I had the feeling that the other group 
members mainly behave fair in this game.       
 
In the workshop you decided how many hectares you plant with oil palm and how 
many hectares you plant with rubber agroforestry. Please indicate below your main 
reasons for your personal decision. Please indicate how strongly you feel about each 
reason. If the respective reason does not hold four you, please tick irrelevant.  
Q 19. Did you cultivate any oil palm in this workshop?  
                   Yes                           No 
If the respondent did not cultivate oil palm, please switch to  Q24 
In this workshop, I planted 
oil palm 
Very strongly Strongly Moderate Irrelevant 
Q 20.....because it 
generates the highest 
earnings for me.  
    
Q 21.….because I did not 
want that my group 
members benefit from my 
decision and  receive the 
externality.   
    
Q 22….because I did not 
want that my group 
member with 10 hectare 
benefits from my decision 
and receive the externality 
    







Q 24.Did you cultivate rubber agroforestry in this workshop?  
 
                  Yes                                   No 
If the respondent did not cultivate oil palm, please switch to   
In this workshop, I planted 
oil palm 
Very strongly Strongly Moderate Irrelevant 
Q 25….because I wanted 
that my group members 






also profit from my 
decision and receive the 
externality.  
Q 26…because I wanted 
to save the environment. 
    
Q 27…because I wanted 
that especially my group 
members with 5 hectares 
benefit from my decision 
and receive the 
externality.  
    









Q 26. Did you have the feeling that the researchers had any expectations related to your 
production decision? Please tick the appropriate answer.  
             
              1. The researcher expected that I cultivate rubber agroforestry 
              2. The researcher expected that I cultivate oil palm.  
              3. The researcher did not have any expectations.  
 
Q 27. If Q26.1. or Q26.2. 
ticked, in how far did these 
expectations influence your 
decision? 
Very strong Strong Moderate Not at all 
    
 
Q 28. Did you own 5 or 10 hectares in this workshop?  
                  5                                   10 
 
If respondent owned 10 ha, go to Q37. 
You owned 5 ha in each decision round. Now, we present some feelings you might 
have had in this workshop with respect to the fact that you had 5ha. Please indicate 
how strong you feel about each aspect.  
 Very strong Strong Moderate 
Not at 
all 
Q 29. I had the feeling that it was absolutely 
random, that I had 5 hectares in this 
workshop.  
    
Q 30. I had the feeling of injustice that I had 
5 hectares in this workshop.     
Q 31. I think participants with 10 hectares 
had feelings of injustice.      
Q 32. I had the feeling that I had the same 
possibilities in this workshop as participants 
with 10ha. 









Q 33.  I had the feeling that I had to make 
more efforts to earn same money as 
participants with 10 hectares.  
    
Q 34.  I had the feeling that participants with 
10 ha earned more money than I.      
Q 35. I had the feeling that I earned more 
money than other participants with 5 
hectares. 
    
Q 36. If Q30 = My feeling of treated unjustly 
decreased throughout the workshop.      
If respondent owned 5 ha, go to Q46. 
You owned 10 ha in each decision round. Now, we would like to present some 
feelings you might have had in this workshop with respect to the fact that you had 
10ha. Please indicate how strong you feel about each aspect.   
Q 37. I had the feeling that it was absolutely 
random that I had 10 hectares in this 
workshop.  
    
Q 38. I had the feeling of injustice that I had 
10 hectares in this workshop.      
Q 39. I think participants with 5 hectares 
had feelings of injustice.      
Q 40. I had the feeling that I had more 
possibilities in this workshop than 
participants with 5ha. 
    
Q 41. I had the feeling that I could influence 
the feeling of injustice of participants with 5 
ha by my decisions.   
    
Q 42.  I had the feelings that I had to make 
fewer efforts than participants with 5 ha.      
Q 43. I had the feeling that participants with 
5 hectares earned less money than I.      
Q 44. I had the impression that I earned 
more money than other participants with 10 
hectares.  
    
Q 45. If Q38, my feeling of treated unjustly 
decreased throughout the workshop.     
 
I decision round 2 and 3, we introduced Payment for Environmental services for the 
cultivation of rubber agroforestry. Now we would like to introduce some feelings 
you might have had with respect to the bonus. Please indicate how strong you feel 
about each aspect.  
 Very strong Strong Moderate 
Not at 
all 
Q 46. I had the feeling that the bonus for the 
planting of jungle rubber privileged 
participants with 5 hectares. 
    
Q 47. I had the feeling that the bonus for 
planting jungle rubber privileged 
participants with 10 hectares. 
    
Q 48. I had the feeling that the bonus 






Q 49. I had the feeling that the bonus was 
unfair.     
When you look back at your life, which statements apply to your experience in lief 
and your person? 
Please indicate how strong you agree or disagree with the statement.  
 Strongly agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Q 50. I have experienced injustice often.      
Q 51. My family has experienced injustice 
often.      
Q 52. I have observed injustice often.       
Q 53. When I meet other people, I am 
concerned about their expectations about 
me. 
    
Q 54. I try to act like others to be consistent 
with social norms.     
Q 55. I would not complain publicity even 
when I have been treated unfairly.        
Q 56. When I have been treated unfairly, I 
will try to punish others’ behavior.      
Q 57. When I have been treated unfairly, I 
will try to punish others’ behavior even if I 
lose money.  
    
 
 Very interesting Interesting Uninteresting 
Very 
uninteresting 
Q 58. How interesting did you find 
this workshop?     
     
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Q 59. I received sufficient 
information on the procedure of 
this workshop.  
    
 




Q 61. How many workshop participants are members of your 
extended family? 
                                         
# 
Q 62. How many workshop participants do you know by name?                                          
# 
Q 63. How many workshop participants do you speak to at least 
once per month? 
                                         
# 
 
Q 64. Nick name  
Q 65. Name of your father  
Q 66. Name of your firstborn  







Thanks for your participation. 
Appendix  6. General Household Survey – Indonesia 
We are researchers from the EFFORT project. It is a collaboration of the University of  
Goettingen, Germany, the Universitas Pertanian Bogor and the Universitas Jambi. We would 
like to better understand the decision farmers make in Jambi Province. If you agree to 
participate in this study you will be asked to answer some questions. You will be asked some 
questions about yourself and your family members, your farming activities and your housing 
and assets. The interview will take about 1 hour.  You are free to ask at any time. All 
information collected in this study is confidential and will be used strictly for research purpose. 
In the last workshop you received an ID number, which will also be used in the analysis of this 
study. Hence your name will not be used. 
1.  Respondent Identification 
QID Question Answer 
1 Interviewer (name)  
2 Respondent (Full name)  
3. Is the respondent HHhead?   
(1) Yes ; (2) No 
 
3.1 If QID 1.3=2 HHhead’s full name  
4 Village (name)  
5 RT (number)  
6 Date of interview (mm/dd/20YY) _________/____________/20________ 
7 Time of interview  From ___.____till____.____ 
8 Signature of interviewer  
 
2. Household Identification and socio-demographic characteristics 
 
QID Question Answer Code 
1. Total number of members staying in the house in the last 12 
months 
 # 
2. Total number of household members younger than 18 years  # 
2.1. If Q2>0: Number of children visiting regularly school?  # 




Please fill in the following table for the RESPONDENT: 












Main occupation of 
repondent (in the last 12 









     
Code A: (1) single; (2) married; (3) widow/widower (4) divorced 
Code B:(1) no graduation; (2)  SD (primary); (3) completed SMP (Middle); (4)  completed SMA (High 
School); (5) D3 or S1 (Associates Degree or University level first stage); (6) student  at  present;(7) other, 
specify:______ 
 Code C: (1) self-employed agriculture; (2) self-employed non-farm activity; (3) government employee; 
(4) daily laborer agriculture; (5) daily laborer outside agriculture; (6) Salaried  employee agriculture; (7) 
Salaried employee outside agriculture; (8) Student; (9) village employee; (10) unemployed, but looking 




If QID 8=(4) or (6) please continue here 
QID Question Answer Code 
9. On what kind of plantation have you mainly (in 
terms of income) worked in the last 12 months? 
 (1)rubber; (2) oil palm; (3) 
other: specify:______ 
 
3. Land ownership 
 
4. Cultivation (perennial crops)/fallow land 
 
4.1 What kind of perennial crops are you currently cultivating? 
 






1. Cultivated area of land  (ha)    
2. Cultivated are of land (under 
contract) (ha)  
   
 
QID  Area of land (ha) 
3. Fallow land ( land not cultivated for the last 12 months)  
  
4.2 History of cultivation 
1. Oil palm 
QID Question Answer  
1. Land owned by the household at the time of 
interview  (1) Yes; (2) No 
                    If QID 1.=1    Size of land in 
village:_____ha 
If QID 1.=1 Size of land 
outside village: ____ha 
2. Land rented by the household at the time of 
interview (1) Yes; (2) No 
 If QID 2. =1 Size of land in 
village: _____ha  
If QID 2.=1 Size of land 
outside village: ____ha 
3. Total land cultivated by your household 
(individually) at the time of interview 
                               Size of land: _____ha 
4. Do you cultivate any land, owned by others, at the 
time of interview?  (1) Yes; (2) No 
 If QID 4.=1 Size of 
land:______ha 
5. Total land cultivated jointly (with inputs and/or 
output shared) with other farmers at the time of 
interview (1) Yes; (2) No  
                  If QID 5.=1 Size of land: 
_____ha 
If for more than one group: 






1. Have you ever cultivated oil palm ? __________(1) Yes; (2) No  
 (if answer: 2, directly go to 5.2.)  
QID  Start 
 
2. With how many hectares did you start cultivation?   
3. Year  
 
 
4. How did this start happen? Code A 
 
 
5. If QID 4. =1, 3, 8 or 9, What kind of crop was on this area before?  Code B 
 
 
Code A: (: (1) purchasing; (2) selling; (3) converted from/to other crops ; (4) conversion from forest ; (5) 
obtained as part of a government program (e.g.“trans migransi”); (6)  established plantation obtained 
from company; 
(7) inherited ; (8) received as gift ; (9) others: specify:______________________________ 
Code B: (1) oil palm; (2) plantation rubber ; (3)  jungle rubber ; (4)  other plantation ; (5) annual crops, 
specify:___________________; (6) grassland; (7 )forest; (8) bush; (9) others, 
specify:________________ 
 
QID Question Answer Code 
6. Have you ever extended the cultivated 
oil palm area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
7. If QID6=1; Have you ever converted 
from forest to oil palm  
 (1)Yes;(2) No 
If QID7 =1 Total area of  
land:_____ha 
8. If QID6=1 Have you ever converted 
from rubber to oil palm 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
If QID8=1 Total area of land:___ha 
9. Have you ever reduced the cultivated 
oil palm area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
 
2. Rubber plantation 
1. Have you ever cultivated rubber monoculture ? __________(1) Yes; (2) No 
 (if answer:2 , directly go to 5.3.) 
QID  Start 
 
2. With how many hectares did you start cultivation?   
3. Year  
 
 
4. How did this start happen? Code A 
 
 




Code A: (: (1) purchasing; (2) selling; (3) converted from/to other crops ; (4) conversion from forest ; (5) 
obtained as part of a government program  (e.g.“trans migrani”); (6)  established plantation obtained 
from company;(7) inherited ; (8) received as gift ; (9) others: 
specify:______________________________ 
Code B: (1) oil palm; (2) plantation rubber ; (3)  jungle rubber ; (4)  other plantation ; (5) annual crops, 
specify:___________________; (6) grassland; (7 )forest; (8) bush; (9) others, 
specify:________________ 
 
QID Question Answer Code 
6. Have you ever extended the cultivated 
rubber plantation area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
7. If QID6=1; Have you ever converted 
from forest to rubber plantation 
 (1)Yes;(2) No 






8. If QID6=1; Have you ever converted 
from oil palm to rubber plantation 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
If QID8=1 Total area of land:___ha 
9. Have you ever reduced the cultivated 
rubber plantation area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
 
3. Jungle rubber 
1. Have you ever cultivated jungle rubber ? __________(1) Yes; (2) No 
 (if answer:2, directly go 5.2.) 
QID  Start 
 
2. With how many hectares did you start cultivation?   
3.  Year  
 
 
4. How did this start happen? Code A 
 
 




Code A: (: (1) purchasing; (2) selling; (3) converted from/to other crops ; (4) conversion from forest ; (5) 
obtained as part of a government program  (e.g.“trans migransi”); (6)  established plantation obtained 
from company;(7) inherited ; (8) received as gift ; (9) others: 
specify:______________________________ 
Code B: (1) oil palm; (2) plantation rubber ; (3)  jungle rubber ; (4)  other plantation ; (5) annual crops, 
specify:___________________; (6) grassland; (7 )forest; (8) bush; (9) others, 
specify:________________ 
 
QID Question Answer Code 
6. Have you ever extended the cultivated 
jungle rubber area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
7. If QID6=1; Have you ever converted 
from forest to jungle rubber  
 (1)Yes;(2) No 
If QID7 =1 Total area of land:_____ha 
8. If QID6=1 Have you ever converted 
from oil palm to jungle rubber 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
If QID8=1 Total area of land:___ha 
9. Have you ever reduced the cultivated 
jungle rubber area 
 (1)Yes; (2) No 
 
5. Plantation  
QID Question Answer Code 
1 How many hours have you spent in the plantations (oil palm, rubber 




On how many days has your hour household consumed following good during the past 7 days? 
QID  #  days in last 7 
days 
1. Fruits collected by one of your household members  
2. Fruits (bought/gift)  
3. Vegetable cultivated/collected by  one of your household members  
4. Vegetable (bought/gift)  
5. Fire wood collected by one of your household members  
6. Fire wood (bought/gift)  
 
7. Perceived Welfare 
 







1. Concerning your expenses for food, which of the following is true (reflects most 
accurately the situation of your household)?  (Code A) 
 
2. Concerning your expenses for children’s’ education, health care, clothing, 
housing, which of the following is true (reflects most accurately the situation of 
your household)?  (Code A) 
 
3. How much does your household need (not spent!) per month for food (in order 




How much does your household need (not spent!) per month for 
childrens’education, health care, clothing, housing (in order to meet all basic 
need adequately)? (‘000 Rp) 
 
Code A : (1) your expenses are below the household’s needs(2) Your expenses are on the average 
comparable to your household’s needs(3) Your expenses exceed your household’s needs 
 
8. Assets 
At present how many/much of the following does this household own that are in 
usable/repairable condition?  




# owned Price (purchasing) Rp. (‘000 Rp) Year (purchasing) (if  
HH owns more than  
one, ask for year  
(purchasing) of oldest) 
Television 
(colour) 
     
Satellite dish      
Television and 
satellite dish 
     
Motor cycle      
Car      
Jeep/Truck/Angk
ot 
     
Fridge      




     
Water pump      
 





1. How would you describe 
the dwelling in which your 
family currently resides? 
 (1) wooden house; (2) stone house; (3) other; 
specify: ____________ 
2. Some people fully own 
their dwelling, some still 
paying them off, or rent 
them or simply live in a 
dwelling they do not pay 
for. What characterize you 
situation? 
 (1)own ; (2)own, with credit; (3)rent; (4) live without 
paying anything; (5) other: specify: 
____________________ 
3. How many rooms does 
your dwelling have (total 
number of rooms on 
compound if same 








4. Material of roof?  (1) iron sheet; (2)wood; (3)tiles; (4) other, 
specify:__________ 
5. On what does the HH 
sleep? 
 (1)mat (natural material) on the floor; (2) mat (natural 
material) above ground; 3)plastic mat on the floor;  
(4) plastic mat above ground; (5) mattress on th e 
floor;  (6) mattress above the ground; (7) foam 
mattress on the floor; (8) foam mattress above the 
ground; (9) spring bed  mattress on the floor; (10) 
spring bed mattress above the ground; (11) other, 
specify:_______________ 
 
10. Social Engagement 
Now, we would like to know more about the titles you hold in this village.   
QID 1 2 3 
 Have you hold a „title“ in this 
village in the last 12 months ? 
(Code A) 
If  QID 1=1-9: Since when do 
you hold this title? (Tahun) 
If QID 1  =1-9: Election 
process? (Code B) 
     
 
     
Code A: (1)Kepala desa (2) Wakil kepala desa; (3) Sekertaris desa; (4) Kepala Dusun; (5) Kepala RT; 
(6) Kepala koperasi petani (7) Ketua kelompok petani; (8) Kepala (ketua) majlis taklim; (9) Sesepuh;  
(10) Kepala lmbarga adat (11) Ketua Karang Taruna; (12) Imam syarrat;  (13) Mubaligh;  (14) Kepala 
anggota politik  (15) Hajis; (16) other, specify:___________________________ 
Code B: (1) inheritage; (2) appointed by  kepala  desa (3) elected by group; (4) elected by all villagers; 
(5) other, specify:___________________________________________ 
 
QID 4. 5. 6.  
 Have you been a 
member in the following 
groups in the last 12 
months? (1) Yes; (2) No 
How often have you been 
to meetings in the last 12 
months (on average)? 
Code A  
Since when are you 
member of this 
group? YYYY 
Koperasi Pertani    
Kelompok Petani    
Majlis taklim    
Karang Taruna    




   
Syara`    
Perangkat desa    
Pemerintah/dewan 
desa 
   
Kelompok politik    
Other, 
specify:_______ 
   
Code A: (1) everyday ; (2) weekly; (3) monthly; (4) once per 6 months; (5) once per year 
 
11.    Environmental Perception 










12. Perception (Oil palm, rubber plantation, Jungle rubber)  
Here you can see three different production systems, which you might know (oil palm, rubber plantation, 
jungle rubber). Now, we are going to read out different question? 
(1) Oil palm; (2) rubber plantation; (3) jungle rubber 
QID  1st 2nd 3th 
1. Which of the production systems do you find most beautiful 
(second most beautiful and third most beautiful)? 
   
2.  Which of the production systems do you find the most natural (the 
second natural and the third natural)? 
   
3. Which of the production systems do you find the most profitable 
(the second profitable and the third profitable)? 
   
4. Which of the production systems do you associate the most with 
the improved wellbeing of your family (the second and the third)? 
   
5. Which of the production systems do you associate the most with 
decreasing number of birds and mammals (the second and the 
third)? 
   
6. Which of the production systems do you associate the most with 
increasing water scarcity (the second and the third)? 
   
7. Which of the production systems do you associate the most with 
decreasing nutrients in the soil (the second and the third)? 
   
 
13. Environmental events 
Over the last five years, was your household affected by the following events? How serious was your 
household affected by this event over last five years?  
QID  Household was____ affected by 
  
  Serious Slightly Not at all 
1. Drought/Water scarcity    
2. Flood/too much rain    
3. Crop diseases     
4. Erosion    
5. Decreasing soil fertility    
 
QID Question Answer Code 
6. Since you live in this village has the number of events 
related to the environment (water scarcity; soil erosion; 
drought; flooding) increased, decreased or stayed 
constant? 
  (1) increase; (2) 
decrease; (3) stay 
constant 
7. Do you think environmental problems (erosion, floods, soil 
fertility, and biodiversity loss) will become worse for your 
village? 








1. Has your household migrated from somewhere to this village?_________ (1) Yes; (2) No 
 ( if 2 switch to QID 8) 
 
2. If QID 1. =1, Did your household migrate as part of trans migrant program? ________ (1) Yes; (2) 
No 
 
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
Place from where the 
household migrated 







HH live in 
this village 
Who was the head of 
the household at time 
of migration (code B) 
What was the major 
source of income 
before migration? 
     
Code A: (1) Jambi province ; (2) Java ; (3) Sumatera North ; (4) Sumatera South ; (5) Kaliman- 
tan ; (6) Sulawesi ; (7) other , specify:________________________________________ 
Code B: (1) current HH head , (2) father/mother of current HH head; (3) grandfather of cur- 
rent HH head (4) other relatives of current HH head ; (5) other, 
specify:__________________________ 
Code C: (1)self-employed agriculture; (2) employed agriculture; (3) gaji buruh; (4)wiraswasta 
  
QID Question  Answer Code 
8. What is your religion?  (1) Islam; (2) Hindu; (3) Protestan; (4) Katolik; (5) 
Pantekosta; (6) Budha; (7) other, 
specify:________________ 
9. What is you ethnic?  (1) Melayu; (2) Rimba; (3) Bugis; (4) Jawa; (5) Sunda; 
(6) Batak; (7) Manado; (8) Minahasa; (9) Poso; (10) 
Minang; (11) Bali; (12) Toraja; (13) Aceh; (14) Makasar; 
(15) other, specify. 
________________________________ 
 
15. Final Questions 
 
We are going to read out some statements related to the distribution of land in your village. We 




Thank you for your participation! 
 
QID  Strongly Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 The purchase of land is often illegal     
2  The amount of land that someone owns is a result 
of heritage    
 
3  The amount of land that someone own is a result 
of hard work    
 
4 The amount of land that someone own is a result 
of luck    
 
5 Income should be made more equal     
6  Hard work does not generally bring success- its 
mor a matter of luck and connections    
 
7  People can only get rich at the expenses of others      
8 Most people that are rich have worked very hard to 







Appendix  7. Payoff table, per treatment and per 
endowment 
A1. Payoff table – Individual scheme 	
No incentive scenario 
Low-endowed  High-endowed 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5  0 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6 
1 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3. 2 2.7  1 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.4 7 6.6 6.2 
2 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 2.9  2 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 
3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1  3 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.4 7 6.6 
4 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3  4 10.8 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.2 6.8 
5 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 3.5  5 11 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.4 7 
6 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7  6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.2 
7 6.4 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9  7 11.4 11 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.4 
8 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1  8 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 
9 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.3  9 11.8 11.4 11 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 7.8 
10 7 6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5  10 12 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 
11 7.2 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.7              
12 7.4 6.9 6.4 5.9 5.4 4.9              
13 7.6 7.1 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.1              
14 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.3              
15 8 7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5              
                    
5% Incentive 
                    
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.55 4.1 3.65 3.2 2.75  0 10 9.65 9.3 8.95 8.6 8.25 7.9 7.55 7.2 6.85 6.5 
1 5.2 4.75 4.3 3.85 3.4 2.95  1 10.2 9.85 9.5 9.15 8.8 8.45 8.1 7.75 7.4 7.05 6.7 
2 5.4 4.95 4.5 4.05 3.6 3.15  2 10.4 10.05 9.7 9.35 9 8.65 8.3 7.95 7.6 7.25 6.9 
3 5.6 5.15 4.7 4.25 3.8 3.35  3 10.6 10.25 9.9 9.55 9.2 8.85 8.5 8.15 7.8 7.45 7.1 
4 5.8 5.35 4.9 4.45 4 3.55  4 10.8 10.45 10.1 9.75 9.4 9.05 8.7 8.35 8 7.65 7.3 
5 6 5.55 5.1 4.65 4.2 3.75  5 11 10.65 10.3 9.95 9.6 9.25 8.9 8.55 8.2 7.85 7.5 
6 6.2 5.75 5.3 4.85 4.4 3.95  6 11.2 10.85 10.5 10.15 9.8 9.45 9.1 8.75 8.4 8.05 7.7 
7 6.4 5.95 5.5 5.05 4.6 4.15  7 11.4 11.05 10.7 10.35 10 9.65 9.3 8.95 8.6 8.25 7.9 
8 6.6 6.15 5.7 5.25 4.8 4.35  8 11.6 11.25 10.9 10.55 10.2 9.85 9.5 9.15 8.8 8.45 8.1 
9 6.8 6.35 5.9 5.45 5 4.55  9 11.8 11.45 11.1 10.75 10.4 10.05 9.7 9.35 9 8.65 8.3 
10 7 6.55 6.1 5.65 5.2 4.75  10 12 11.65 11.3 10.95 10.6 10.25 9.9 9.55 9.2 8.85 8.5 
11 7.2 6.75 6.3 5.85 5.4 4.95              
12 7.4 6.95 6.5 6.05 5.6 5.15              
13 7.6 7.15 6.7 6.25 5.8 5.35              
14 7.8 7.35 6.9 6.45 6 5.55              
15 8 7.55 7.1 6.65 6.2 5.75              
10% incentive 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.4 3  0 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7 
1 5.2 4.8 4.4 4 3.6 3.2  1 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.2 
2 5.4 5 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.4  2 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8 7.7 7.4 
3 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4 3.6  3 10.6 10.3 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 
4 5.8 5.4 5 4.6 4.2 3.8  4 10.8 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 
5 6 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4 4  5 11 10.7 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8 
6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5 4.6 4.2  6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 
7 6.4 6 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4  7 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 8.7 8.4 
8 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5 4.6  8 11.6 11.3 11 10.7 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 
9 6.8 6.4 6 5.6 5.2 4.8  9 11.8 11.5 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 
10 7 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5  10 12 11.7 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 
11 7.2 6.8 6.4 6 5.6 5.2              
12 7.4 7 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4              
13 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6 5.6              
14 7.8 7.4 7 6.6 6.2 5.8              
15 8 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6              
25% incentive 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.75 4.5 4.25 4 3.75  0 10 9.85 9.7 9.55 9.4 9.25 9.1 8.95 8.8 8.65 8.5 
1 5.2 4.95 4.7 4.45 4.2 3.95  1 10.2 10.05 9.9 9.75 9.6 9.45 9.3 9.15 9 8.85 8.7 
2 5.4 5.15 4.9 4.65 4.4 4.15  2 10.4 10.25 10.1 9.95 9.8 9.65 9.5 9.35 9.2 9.05 8.9 






4 5.8 5.55 5.3 5.05 4.8 4.55  4 10.8 10.65 10.5 10.35 10.2 10.05 9.9 9.75 9.6 9.45 9.3 
5 6 5.75 5.5 5.25 5 4.75  5 11 10.85 10.7 10.55 10.4 10.25 10.1 9.95 9.8 9.65 9.5 
6 6.2 5.95 5.7 5.45 5.2 4.95  6 11.2 11.05 10.9 10.75 10.6 10.45 10.3 10.15 10 9.85 9.7 
7 6.4 6.15 5.9 5.65 5.4 5.15  7 11.4 11.25 11.1 10.95 10.8 10.65 10.5 10.35 10.2 10.05 9.9 
8 6.6 6.35 6.1 5.85 5.6 5.35  8 11.6 11.45 11.3 11.15 11 10.85 10.7 10.55 10.4 10.25 10.1 
9 6.8 6.55 6.3 6.05 5.8 5.55  9 11.8 11.65 11.5 11.35 11.2 11.05 10.9 10.75 10.6 10.45 10.3 
10 7 6.75 6.5 6.25 6 5.75  10 12 11.85 11.7 11.55 11.4 11.25 11.1 10.95 10.8 10.65 10.5 
11 7.2 6.95 6.7 6.45 6.2 5.95              
12 7.4 7.15 6.9 6.65 6.4 6.15              
13 7.6 7.35 7.1 6.85 6.6 6.35              
14 7.8 7.55 7.3 7.05 6.8 6.55              
15 8 7.75 7.5 7.25 7 6.75              
30% incentive 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4  0 10 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 9 
1 5.2 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2  1 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 
2 5.4 5.2 5 4.8 4.6 4.4  2 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.4 
3 5.6 5.4 5.2 5 4.8 4.6  3 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 
4 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 5 4.8  4 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 
5 6 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 5  5 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 
6 6.2 6 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2  6 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 
7 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 5.6 5.4  7 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 
8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 5.6  8 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 
9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8  9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 
10 7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6  10 12 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 
11 7.2 7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2              
12 7.4 7.2 7 6.8 6.6 6.4              
13 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 6.8 6.6              
14 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 6.8              
15 8 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.2 7              
                    
A2. Payoff table – Collective scheme 	
5% incentives 
Low-endowed  High-endowed 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5  0 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.55 7.2 6.85 6.5 
1 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.7  1 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 8.1 7.75 7.4 7.05 6.7 
2 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.15  2 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.65 8.3 7.95 7.6 7.25 6.9 
3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.35  3 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9.2 8.85 8.5 8.15 7.8 7.45 7.1 
4 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.45 4 3.55  4 10.8 10.4 10 9.75 9.4 9.05 8.7 8.35 8 7.65 7.3 
5 6 5.5 5.1 4.65 4.2 3.75  5 11 10.6 10.3 9.95 9.6 9.25 8.9 8.55 8.2 7.85 7.5 
6 6.2 5.75 5.3 4.85 4.4 3.95  6 11.2 10.85 10.5 10.15 9.8 9.45 9.1 8.75 8.4 8.05 7.7 
7 6.4 5.95 5.5 5.05 4.6 4.15  7 11.4 11.05 10.7 10.35 10 9.65 9.3 8.95 8.6 8.25 7.9 
8 6.6 6.15 5.7 5.25 4.8 4.35  8 11.6 11.25 10.9 10.55 10.2 9.85 9.5 9.15 8.8 8.45 8.1 
9 6.8 6.35 5.9 5.45 5 4.55  9 11.8 11.45 11.1 10.75 10.4 10.05 9.7 9.35 9 8.65 8.3 
10 7 6.55 6.1 5.65 5.2 4.75  10 12 11.65 11.3 10.95 10.6 10.25 9.9 9.55 9.2 8.85 8.5 
11 7.2 6.75 6.3 5.85 5.4 4.95              
12 7.4 6.95 6.5 6.05 5.6 5.15              
13 7.6 7.15 6.7 6.25 5.8 5.35              
14 7.8 7.35 6.9 6.45 6 5.55              
15 8 7.55 7.1 6.65 6.2 5.75              
10%  incentives 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5  0 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 7.9 7.6 7.3 7 
1 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.7  1 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.2 
2 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.4  2 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.9 8.6 8.3 8 7.7 7.4 
3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 4 3.6  3 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 
4 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.8  4 10.8 10.4 10 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 
5 6 5.5 5.2 4.8 4.4 4  5 11 10.6 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8 
6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5 4.6 4.2  6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 
7 6.4 6 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.4  7 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 8.7 8.4 
8 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5 4.6  8 11.6 11.3 11 10.7 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 
9 6.8 6.4 6 5.6 5.2 4.8  9 11.8 11.5 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3 10 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 
10 7 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 5  10 12 11.7 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9 
11 7.2 6.8 6.4 6 5.6 5.2              
12 7.4 7 6.6 6.2 5.8 5.4              
13 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6 5.6              
14 7.8 7.4 7 6.6 6.2 5.8              
15 8 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6              
25%  incentives 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






1 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.7  1 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 9.3 9.15 9 8.85 8.7 
2 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 4.15  2 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 9.65 9.5 9.35 9.2 9.05 8.9 
3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 4.6 4.35  3 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 10 9.85 9.7 9.55 9.4 9.25 9.1 
4 5.8 5.3 4.8 5.05 4.8 4.55  4 10.8 10.4 10 10.35 10.2 10.05 9.9 9.75 9.6 9.45 9.3 
5 6 5.5 5.5 5.25 5 4.75  5 11 10.6 10.7 10.55 10.4 10.25 10.1 9.95 9.8 9.65 9.5 
6 6.2 5.95 5.7 5.45 5.2 4.95  6 11.2 11.05 10.9 10.75 10.6 10.45 10.3 10.15 10 9.85 9.7 
7 6.4 6.15 5.9 5.65 5.4 5.15  7 11.4 11.25 11.1 10.95 10.8 10.65 10.5 10.35 10.2 10.05 9.9 
8 6.6 6.35 6.1 5.85 5.6 5.35  8 11.6 11.45 11.3 11.15 11 10.85 10.7 10.55 10.4 10.25 10.1 
9 6.8 6.55 6.3 6.05 5.8 5.55  9 11.8 11.65 11.5 11.35 11.2 11.05 10.9 10.75 10.6 10.45 10.3 
10 7 6.75 6.5 6.25 6 5.75  10 12 11.85 11.7 11.55 11.4 11.25 11.1 10.95 10.8 10.65 10.5 
11 7.2 6.95 6.7 6.45 6.2 5.95              
12 7.4 7.15 6.9 6.65 6.4 6.15              
13 7.6 7.35 7.1 6.85 6.6 6.35              
14 7.8 7.55 7.3 7.05 6.8 6.55              
15 8 7.75 7.5 7.25 7 6.75              
30%  incentives 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5  0 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 8.4 8 7.6 9.3 9.2 9.1 9 
1 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.7  1 10.2 9.8 9.4 9 8.6 8.2 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 
2 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.4 4.4  2 10.4 10 9.6 9.2 8.8 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.4 
3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 4.8 4.6  3 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.4 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.6 
4 5.8 5.3 4.8 5.2 5 4.8  4 10.8 10.4 10 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 9.9 9.8 
5 6 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.2 5  5 11 10.6 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1 10 
6 6.2 6 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2  6 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2 
7 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 5.6 5.4  7 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 
8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 5.6  8 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 
9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8  9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 10.9 10.8 
10 7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6  10 12 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1 11 
11 7.2 7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2              
12 7.4 7.2 7 6.8 6.6 6.4              
13 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 6.8 6.6              
14 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 6.8              










Appendix  8. Correlation among social capital variables 
 
Share of 































People in the 
same session with 
whom they speak 
in a month 
Share of rubber 1.00 
           
Treatment 0.02 1.00 
          
Incentive 0.07* 0.00 1.00 
         
Endowment 0.02 0.00  0.00  1.00 
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People from the 
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Family members 
participating in 















-0.44 0.16 1.00  
  

























People in the 
same session 
with whom they 







-0.02  0.10 0.04  -0.00  0.11 0.05  -0.04  0.27  1.00 
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